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The fine-tuning of the universe for intelligent life has received a great deal of attention in recent
years, both in the philosophical and scientific literature. The claim is that in the space of
possible physical laws, parameters and initial conditions, the set that permits the evolution of
intelligent life is very small. I present here a review of the scientific literature, outlining cases
of fine-tuning in the classic works of Carter, Carr and Rees, and Barrow and Tipler, as well
as more recent work. To sharpen the discussion, the role of the antagonist will be played by
Victor Stenger’s recent book The Fallacy of Fine-Tuning: Why the Universe is Not Designed
for Us. Stenger claims that all known fine-tuning cases can be explained without the need
for a multiverse. Many of Stenger’s claims will be found to be highly problematic. We will
touch on such issues as the logical necessity of the laws of nature; objectivity, invariance and
symmetry; theoretical physics and possible universes; entropy in cosmology; cosmic inflation
and initial conditions; galaxy formation; the cosmological constant; stars and their formation;
the properties of elementary particles and their effect on chemistry and the macroscopic world;
the origin of mass; grand unified theories; and the dimensionality of space and time. I also
provide an assessment of the multiverse, noting the significant challenges that it must face. I
do not attempt to defend any conclusion based on the fine-tuning of the universe for intelligent
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1 Introduction
The fine-tuning of the universe for intelligent life has received much attention in recent times.
Beginning with the classic papers of Carter (1974) and Carr & Rees (1979), and the extensive
discussion of Barrow & Tipler (1986), a number of authors have noticed that very small
changes in the laws, parameters and initial conditions of physics would result in a universe
unable to evolve and support intelligent life.
We begin by defining our terms. We will refer to the laws of nature, initial conditions and
physical constants of a particular universe as its physics for short. Conversely, we define a
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‘universe’ be a connected region of spacetime over which physics is effectively constant1. The
claim that the universe is fine-tuned can be formulated as:
FT: In the set of possible physics, the subset that permit the evolution of life is
very small.
FT can be understood as a counterfactual claim, that is, a claim about what would have
been. Such claims are not uncommon in everyday life. For example, we can formulate the
claim that Roger Federer would almost certainly defeat me in a game of tennis as: “in the
set of possible games of tennis between myself and Roger Federer, the set in which I win is
extremely small”. This claim is undoubtedly true, even though none of the infinitely-many
possible games has been played.
Our formulation of FT, however, is in obvious need of refinement. What determines the
set of possible physics? Where exactly do we draw the line between “universes”? How is
“smallness” being measured? Are we considering only cases where the evolution of life is
physically impossible or just extremely improbable? What is life? We will press on with the
our formulation of FT as it stands, pausing to note its inadequacies when appropriate. As it
stands, FT is precise enough to distinguish itself from a number of other claims for which it
is often mistaken. FT is not the claim that this universe is optimal for life, that it contains
the maximum amount of life per unit volume or per baryon, that carbon-based life is the only
possible type of life, or that the only kinds of universes that support life are minor variations
on this universe. These claims, true or false, are simply beside the point.
The reason why FT is an interesting claim is that it makes the existence of life in this
universe appear to be something remarkable, something in need of explanation. The intuition
here is that, if ours were the only universe, and if the causes that established the physics of
our universe were indifferent to whether it would evolve life, then the chances of hitting upon
a life-permitting universe are very small. As Leslie (1989, pg. 121) notes, “[a] chief reason
for thinking that something stands in special need of explanation is that we actually glimpse
some tidy way in which it might be explained”. Consider the following tidy explanations:
• This universe is one of a large number of variegated universes, produced by physical
processes that randomly scan through (a subset of) the set of possible physics. Even-
tually, a universe will be created that is a member of the life-permitting set. Only such
universes can be observed, since only such universes contain observers.
• There exists a transcendent, personal creator of the universe. This entity desires to
create a universe in which other minds will be able to form. Thus, the entity chooses
from the set of possibilities a universe which is foreseen to evolve intelligent life2.
These scenarios are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive, but if either or both were true
then we would have a tidy explanation of why our universe, against the odds, supports the
evolution of life.
Our discussion of the multiverse will touch on the so-called anthropic principle, which we
will formulate as follows:
1We may wish to stipulate that a given observer by definition only observes one universe. Such finer points
will not effect our discussion
2The counter-argument presented in Stenger’s book (page 252), borrowing from a paper by Ikeda and
Jeffreys, does not address this possibility. Rather, it argues against a deity which intervenes to sustain life in
this universe. I have discussed this elsewhere: ikedajeff.notlong.com
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AP: If observers observe anything, they will observe conditions that permit the
existence of observers.
Tautological? Yes! The anthropic principle is best thought of as a selection effect. Selection
effects occur whenever we observe a non-random sample of an underlying population. Such
effects are well known to astronomers. An example is Malmquist bias — in any survey of
the distant universe, we will only observe objects that are bright enough to be detected by
our telescope. This statement is tautological, but is nevertheless non-trivial. The penalty of
ignoring Malmquist bias is a plague of spurious correlations. For example, it will seem that
distant galaxies are on average intrinsically brighter than nearby ones.
A selection bias alone cannot explain anything. Consider the case of quasars. When first
discovered, quasars were thought to be a strange new kind of star in our galaxy. Schmidt
(1963) measured their redshift, showing that they were more than a million times further
away than previously thought. It follows that they must be incredibly bright. The question
that naturally arises is: how are quasars so luminous? The (best) answer is: because quasars
are powered by gravitational energy released by matter falling into a super-massive black hole
(Zel’dovich, 1964; Lynden-Bell, 1969). The answer is not: because otherwise we wouldn’t see
them. Noting that if we observe any object in the very distant universe then it must be
very bright does not explain why we observe any distant objects at all. Similarly, AP cannot
explain why life and its necessary conditions exist at all.
In anticipation of future sections, Table 1 defines some relevant physical quantities.
2 Cautionary Tales
There are a few fallacies to keep in mind as we consider cases of fine-tuning.
The Cheap-Binoculars Fallacy: “Don’t waste money buying expensive binoculars. Sim-
ply stand closer to the object you wish to view”3. We can make any point (or outcome)
in possibility space seem more likely by zooming-in on its neighbourhood. Having identified
the life-permitting region of parameter space, we can make it look big by deftly choosing the
limits of the plot. We could also distort parameter space using, for example, logarithmic axes.
A good example of this fallacy is quantifying the fine-tuning of a parameter relative to its
value in our universe, rather than the totality of possibility space. If a dart lands 3 mm from
the centre of a dartboard, is it obviously fallacious to say that because the dart could have
landed twice as far away and still scored a bullseye, therefore the throw is only fine-tuned to
a factor of two and there is “plenty of room” inside the bullseye. The correct comparison is
between the area (or more precisely, solid angle) of the bullseye to the area in which the dart
could land. Similarly, comparing the life-permitting range to the value of the parameter in
our universe necessarily produces a bias toward underestimating fine-tuning, since we know
that our universe is in the life-permitting range.
The Flippant Funambulist Fallacy: “Tightrope-walking is easy!”, the man says, “just
look at all the places you could stand and not fall to your death!”. This is nonsense, of
3Viz Top Tip: http://www.viz.co.uk/toptips.html
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Quantity Symbol Value in our universe
Speed of light c 299792458 m s−1
Gravitational constant G 6.673 ×10−11 m3 kg−1 s−2
(Reduced) Planck constant ~ 1.05457148 ×10−34 m2 kg s−2
Planck mass-energy mPl =
√
~c/G 1.2209 ×1022 MeV
Mass of electron; proton; neutron me; mp; mn 0.511; 938.3; 939.6 MeV
Mass of up; down; strange quark mu; md; ms (Approx.) 2.4; 4.8; 104 MeV
Ratio of electron to proton mass β (1836.15)−1





Hypercharge coupling constant α1 1/98.4
Weak coupling constant α2 1/29.6
Strong force coupling constant αs = α3 0.1187
Fine structure constant α = α1α2α1+α2 1/127.9 (1/137 at low energy)
Higgs vacuum expectation value v 246.2 GeV
QCD scale ΛQCD ≈ 200 MeV
Yukawa couplings Γi =
√
2mi/v Listed in Tegmark et al. (2006)
Hubble constant H 71 km/s/Mpc (today)
Cosmological constant (energy density) Λ (ρΛ) ρΛ = (2.3× 10−3eV )−4
Amplitude of primordial fluctuations Q 2× 10−5
Total matter mass per photon ξ ≈ 4 eV
Baryonic mass per photon ξbaryon ≈ 0.61 eV
Table 1: Fundamental and derived physical and cosmological parameters, using the definitions
in Burgess & Moore (2006). Many of these quantities are listed in Tegmark et al. (2006),
Burgess & Moore (2006, Table A.2) and Nakamura (2010). Unless otherwise noted, standard
model coupling constants are evaluated at mZ , the mass of the Z particle, and hereafter we
will use Planck units: G = ~ = c = 1, unless reintroduced for clarity. Note that often in the
fine-tuning literature (e.g. Carr & Rees, 1979; Barrow & Tipler, 1986, pg. 354), the low energy
weak coupling constant is defined as αw ≡ GFm2e , where GF = 1/
√
2v2 = (292.8 GeV)−2 is





2 ≈ 3× 10−12. Note that this means that αw is independent of α2.
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course: a tightrope walker must overbalance in a very specific direction if her path is to be
life-permitting. The freedom to wander is tightly constrained. When identifying the life-
permitting region of parameter space, the shape of the region is not particularly relevant. An
elongated life-friendly region is just as fine-tuned as a compact region of the same area. The
fact that we can change the setting on one cosmic dial, so long as we very carefully change
another at the same time, does not necessarily mean that FT is false.
The Sequential Juggler Fallacy: “Juggling is easy!”, the man says, “you can throw and
catch a ball. So just juggle all five, one at a time”. Juggling five balls one-at-a-time isn’t
really juggling. For a universe to be life-permitting, it must satisfy a number of constraints
simultaneously. For example, a universe with the right physical laws for complex organic
molecules, but which recollapses before it is cool enough to permit neutral atoms will not
form life. One cannot refute FT by considering life-permitting criteria one-at-a-time and
noting that each can be satisfied in a wide region of parameter space. In set-theoretic terms,
we are interested in the intersection of the life-permitting regions, not the union.
The Cane Toad Solution: In 1935, the Bureau of Sugar Experiment Stations was worried
by the effect of the native cane beetle on Australian sugar cane crops. They introduced 102
cane toads, imported from Hawaii, into parts of Northern Queensland in the hope that they
would eat the beetles. And thus the problem was solved forever, except for the 200 million
cane toads that now call eastern Australia home, eating smaller native animals, and secreting
a poison that kills any larger animal that preys on them. A cane toad solution, then, is one
that doesn’t consider whether the end result is worse than the problem itself. When presented
with a proposed fine-tuning explainer, we must ask whether the solution is more fine-tuned
than the problem.
3 Stenger’s Case
We will sharpen the presentation of cases of fine-tuning by responding to the claims of Victor
Stenger. Stenger is a particle physicist, a noted speaker, and the author of a number of books
and articles on science and religion. In his latest book, “The Fallacy of Fine-Tuning: Why
the Universe is Not Designed for Us”4, he makes the following bold claim:
“[T]he most commonly cited examples of apparent fine-tuning can be readily
explained by the application of a little well-established physics and cosmology.
. . . [S]ome form of life would have occurred in most universes that could be de-
scribed by the same physical models as ours, with parameters whose ranges varied
over ranges consistent with those models. And I will show why we can expect to
be able to describe any uncreated universe with the same models and laws with
at most slight, accidental variations. Plausible natural explanations can be found
for those parameters that are most crucial for life. . . . My case against fine-tuning
will not rely on speculations beyond well-established physics nor on the existence
of multiple universes.” [Foft 22, 24]
Let’s be clear on the task that Stenger has set for himself. There are a great many
scientists, of varying religious persuasions, who accept that the universe is fine-tuned for
4Hereafter, “Foft x” will refer to page x of Stenger’s book.
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life, e.g. Barrow, Carr, Carter, Davies, Dawkins, Deutsch, Ellis, Greene, Guth, Harrison,
Hawking, Linde, Page, Penrose, Polkinghorne, Rees, Sandage, Smolin, Susskind, Tegmark,
Tipler, Vilenkin, Weinberg, Wheeler, Wilczek5. They differ, of course, on what conclusion
we should draw from this fact. Stenger, on the other hand, claims that the universe is not
fine-tuned.
4 Cases of Fine-Tuning
What is the evidence that FT is true? We would like to have meticulously examined every
possible universe and determined whether any form of life evolves. Sadly, this is currently
beyond our abilities. Instead, we rely on simplified models and more general arguments to
step out into possible-physics-space. If the set of life-permitting universes is small amongst
the universes that we have been able to explore, then we can reasonably infer that it is unlikely
that the trend will be miraculously reversed just beyond the horizon of our knowledge.
4.1 The Laws of Nature
Are the laws of nature themselves fine-tuned? Stenger defends the ambitious claim that the
laws of nature could not have been different because they can be derived from the requirement
that they be Point-of-View Invariant (hereafter, PoVI). He says:
“. . . [In previous sections] we have derived all of classical physics, including classical
mechanics, Newton’s law of gravity, and Maxwell’s equations of electromagnetism,
from just one simple principle: the models of physics cannot depend on the point
of view of the observer. We have also seen that special and general relativity follow
from the same principle, although Einstein’s specific model for general relativity
depends on one or two additional assumptions. I have offered a glimpse at how
quantum mechanics also arises from the same principle, although again a few other
assumptions, such as the probability interpretation of the state vector, must be
added. . . . [The laws of nature] will be the same in any universe where no special
point of view is present.” [Foft 88, 91]
4.1.1 Invariance, Covariance and Symmetry
We can formulate Stenger’s argument for this conclusion as follows:
LN1. If our formulation of the laws of nature is to be objective, it must be PoVI.
LN2. Invariance implies conserved quantities (Noether’s theorem).
LN3. Thus, “when our models do not depend on a particular point or direction in space or a
particular moment in time, then those models must necessarily contain the quantities
linear momentum, angular momentum, and energy, all of which are conserved. Physi-
cists have no choice in the matter, or else their models will be subjective, that is, will
give uselessly different results for every different point of view. And so the conservation
5References: Barrow & Tipler (1986), Carr & Rees (1979), Carter (1974), Davies (2006), Dawkins (2006),
Redfern (2006) for Deutsch’s view on fine-tuning, Ellis (1993), Greene (2011), Guth (2007), Harrison (2003),
Hawking & Mlodinow (2010, pg. 161), Linde (2008), Page (2011b), Penrose (2004, pg. 758), Polkinghorne &
Beale (2009), Rees (1999), Smolin (2007), Susskind (2005), Tegmark et al. (2006), Vilenkin (2006), Weinberg
(1994) and Wheeler (1996). See also Carr (2007).
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principles are not laws built into the universe or handed down by deity to govern the
behavior of matter. They are principles governing the behavior of physicists.” [Foft
82, emphasis original]
This argument commits the fallacy of equivocation — the term “invariant” has changed its
meaning between LN1 and LN2. The difference is decisive but rather subtle, owing to the
different contexts in which the term can be used. We will tease the two meanings apart by
defining covariance and symmetry, considering a number of test cases.
Galileo’s Ship: We can see where Stenger’s argument has gone wrong with a simple ex-
ample, before discussing technicalities in later sections. Consider this delightful passage from
Galileo regarding the brand of relativity that bears his name:
“Shut yourself up with some friend in the main cabin below decks on some large
ship, and have with you there some flies, butterflies, and other small flying animals.
Have a large bowl of water with some fish in it; hang up a bottle that empties
drop by drop into a wide vessel beneath it. With the ship standing still, observe
carefully how the little animals fly with equal speed to all sides of the cabin. The
fish swim indifferently in all directions; the drops fall into the vessel beneath;
and, in throwing something to your friend, you need throw it no more strongly
in one direction than another, the distances being equal; jumping with your feet
together, you pass equal spaces in every direction. When you have observed all
these things carefully (though doubtless when the ship is standing still everything
must happen in this way), have the ship proceed with any speed you like, so long
as the motion is uniform and not fluctuating this way and that. You will discover
not the least change in all the effects named, nor could you tell from any of them
whether the ship was moving or standing still6.”
Note carefully what Galileo is not saying. He is not saying that the situation can be viewed
from a variety of different viewpoints and it looks the same. He is not saying that we can
describe flight-paths of the butterflies using a coordinate system with any origin, orientation
or velocity relative to the ship.
Rather, Galileo’s observation is much more remarkable. He is stating that the two sit-
uations, the stationary ship and moving ship, which are externally distinct are nevertheless
internally indistinguishable. We will borrow a definition from Healey (2007, Chapter 6):
“A 1-1 mapping φ : S → S of a set of situations onto itself is a strong empirical
symmetry if and only if no two situations related by φ can be distinguished by
means of measurements confined to each situation.”
Galileo is saying that situations that are moving at a constant velocity with respect to each
other are related by a strong empirical symmetry. There are two situations, not one. These
are not different descriptions of the same situation, but rather different situations with the
same internal properties.
The reason why Galilean relativity is so shocking and counterintuitive7 is that there is no
a priori reason to expect distinct situations to be indistinguishable. If you and your friend
6Quoted in Healey (2007, Chapter 6).
7It remains so today, as evidenced by the difficulty that even good lecturers have in successfully teaching
Newtonian mechanics to undergraduates (Griffiths, 1997).
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attempt to describe the butterfly in the stationary ship and end up with “uselessly different
results”, then at least one of you has messed up your sums. If your friend tells you his point-
of-view, you should be able to perform a mathematical transformation on your model and
reproduce his model. None of this will tell you how the butterflies will fly when the ship is
speeding on the open ocean. An Aristotelian butterfly would presumably be plastered against
the aft wall of the cabin. It would not be heard to cry: “Oh, the subjectivity of it all!”
Galilean relativity, and symmetries in general, have nothing whatsoever to do with point-
of-view invariance. A universe in which Galilean relativity did not hold would not wallow
in subjectivity. It would be an objective, observable fact that the butterflies would fly dif-
ferently in a speeding ship. This is Stenger’s confusion: requiring objectivity in describing a
given situation does not imply a symmetry. Symmetries relate distinct-but-indistinguishable
situations.
Lagrangian Dynamics: We can see this same point in a more formal context. Lagrangian
dynamics is a framework for physical theories that, while originally developed as a powerful
approach to Newtonian dynamics, underlies much of modern physics. Relativity, quantum
field theory and even string theory can be (and often are) formulated in terms of Lagrangians.
Without loss of generality, we will consider here classical Lagrangian dynamics. The method
of analysing a physical system in Lagrangian dynamics is as follows:
• Write down coordinates (qi) representing each of the degrees of freedom of your system.
For example, for two beads moving along a wire, q1 can represent the position of particle
1, and q2 for particle 2.
• Write down the Lagrangian (L) (classically, the kinetic minus potential energy) of the
system in terms of time t, the coordinates qi, and their time derivatives q˙i.
• The equations governing how the qi change with time are found by minimising the
‘action’: S =
∫
Ldt. Through the wonders of calculus of variations, this is equivalent









= 0 . (1)
One of the features of the Lagrangian formalism is that it is covariant. Suppose that we
return to the first step and decide that we want to use different coordinates for our system,
say si, which are expressed as functions of the old coordinates qi and t. We can then express
the Lagrangian L in terms of t, si and s˙i by substituting the new coordinates for the old
ones. Now, what equation must we solve to minimise the action? The answer is equation
1 again, but replacing q’s with s’s. In other words, it does not matter what coordinates we
use. The equations take the same form in any coordinate system, and are thus said to be
covariant. Note that this is true of any Lagrangian, and any (sufficiently smooth) coordinate
transformation si(t, qj). Objectivity (and PoVI) are guaranteed.
Now, consider a specific Lagrangian L that has the following special property — there
exists a continuous family of coordinate transformations that leave L unchanged. Such a
transformation is called a symmetry (or isometry) of the Lagrangian. The simplest case is
where a particular coordinate does not appear in the expression for L. Noether’s theorem
tells us that, for each continuous symmetry, there will be a conserved quantity. For example,
if time does not appear explicitly in the Lagrangian, then energy will be conserved.
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Note carefully the difference between covariance and symmetry. Both could justifiably
be called “coordinate invariance” but they are not the same thing. Covariance is a property
of the entire Lagrangian formalism. A symmetry is a property of a particular Lagrangian
L. Covariance holds with respect to all (sufficiently smooth) coordinate transformations.
A symmetry is linked to a particular coordinate transformation. Covariance gives us no
information whatsoever about which Lagrangian best describes a given physical scenario.
Symmetries provide strong constraints on the which Lagrangians are consistent with empirical
data. Covariance is a mathematical fact about our formalism. Symmetries can be confirmed
or falsified by experiment.
Furthermore, Noether’s theorem only links symmetry to conservation for particles and
fields that obey the principle of least action. As Brading and Brown (in Brading & Castellani,
2003, pg. 99) note:
“. . . in order to make the connection between a certain symmetry and an associ-
ated conservation law, we must . . . involve dynamically significant information or
assumptions, such as the assumption that all the fields in the theory satisfy the
Euler-Lagrange equations of motion. . . . Thus, when we use Noether’s first theo-
rem to connect a symmetry with a conservation law we have to put the relevant
dynamical information.”
The principle of least action is not a necessary truth; neither does it follow from PoVI.
Finally, the Lagrangian formalism itself is not forced upon us a priori. There are plenty of
other mathematical structures and systems lurking in the set of all possible worlds.
Symmetry and Mere Redescription: It will be useful to clarify how a theory can give
“uselessly different results”. When a theoretical calculation predicts an observation, it is
obviously unacceptable for the theory to give multiple answers when observation gives one.
Consider, for example, describing the motion of the Earth and Sun in Newtonian mechanics.
We introduce a coordinate system representing the position of each body as an element
(x, y, z) ∈ R3. Calculating the period of the Earth’s orbit must not depend on our choice
of mathematical apparatus introduced to aid calculation. Changing the coordinate system
is mere redescription; the Earth in any coordinate system will still complete its orbit in
365.256363 days.
Here is the crucial point: the fact that we are free to describe the system in a rotated
coordinate system neither implies nor follows from the rotational symmetry of the system.
Suppose that Newton’s law of gravitation were modified by a dipole-like term,
F = −G m1m2|r12|2 rˆ12 (1 + αd rˆ12 · bˆ) , (2)
where a hatted vector is of unit length, r12 = r1− r2, αd is a dimensionless parameter, and bˆ
is a fixed unit vector. Due to the term involving bˆ, this law is not rotationally symmetric, and
thus angular momentum is not conserved. However, we are still free to use any coordinate
system to describe they system. In particular, we are free use a Cartesian coordinate system
rotated to any orientation and our prediction of the outcome of any observation will remain
the same.
Lorentz Invariance: Let’s look more closely at some specific cases. Stenger applies his
general PoVI argument to Einstein’s special theory of relativity:
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“Special relativity similarly results from the principle that the models of physics
must be the same for two observers moving at a constant velocity with respect to
one another. . . . Physicists are forced to make their models Lorentz invariant so
they do not depend on the particular point of view of one reference frame moving
with respect to another.”
This claim is false. Physicists are perfectly free to postulate theories which are not Lorentz
invariant, and a great deal of experimental and theoretical effort has been expended to this
end. The compilation of Kostelecky´ & Russell (2011) cites 127 papers that investigate Lorentz
violation. Pospelov & Romalis (2004) give an excellent overview of this industry, giving an
example of a Lorentz-violating Lagrangian:
L = −bµψ¯γµγ5ψ − 1
2
Hµνψ¯σ
µνψ − kµµναβAνAβ,α , (3)
where the fields bµ, kµ and Hµν are external vector and antisymmetric tensor backgrounds
that introduce a preferred frame and therefore break Lorentz invariance; all other symbols
have their usual meanings (e.g. Nagashima, 2010). A wide array of laboratory, astrophysical
and cosmological tests place impressively tight bounds on these fields. At the moment Lorentz
invariance is just a theoretical possibility. But that’s the point.
Take the work of Bear et al. (2000), who attempt to measure bµ using a spin maser
experiment. If Stenger were correct, this experiment would be aimed at finding objective
evidence that physics is subjective. Thankfully, they report that the objectivity of physics
has been confirmed to a level of 10−31 GeV. Future experiments may provide convincing,
reproducible, empirical evidence that physicists might as well give up.
Ironically, the best cure to Stenger’s conflation of “frame-dependent” with “subjective” is
special relativity. The length of a rigid rod depends on the reference frame of the observer: if it
is 2 metres long it its own rest frame, it will be 1 metre long in the frame of an observer passing
at 87% of the speed of light8. It does not follow that the length of the rod is “subjective”,
in the sense that the length of the rod is just the personal opinion of a given observer, or
in the sense that these two different answers are “uselessly different”. It is an objective
fact that the length of the rod is frame-dependent. Physics is perfectly capable of studying
frame-dependent quantities, like the length of a rod, and frame-dependent laws, such as the
Lagrangian in Equation 3.
We can look at the “axioms” of special relativity and see whether these must hold in all
possible universes. Einstein famously proposed two postulates: the principle of relativity, that
all inertial frames are totally equivalent for the performance of all physical experiments (cf.
Rindler, 2006), and the constancy of the speed of light in every inertial frame. One must also
assume spacetime homogeneity and spatial isotropy in order to derive the Lorentz transform9.
Which of these axioms are necessarily true? None. The relativity principle isn’t even
obviously true, as the two millennia between Aristotle and Galileo demonstrate, and Galileo
(and Newton) only applied the principle to mechanics; Einstein extended the principle to
8Note that it isn’t just that the rod appears to be shorter. Length contraction in special relativity is not
just an optical illusion resulting from the finite speed of light. See, for example, Penrose (1959).
9Beginning with von Ignatowsky (1910), many have attempted to derive the Lorentz transform without
Einstein’s second postulate (see Field, 2004; Rindler, 2006; Certik, 2007, and references therein); John Stewart’s
(unpublished) lecture notes inform us that: “This derivation . . . has be re-invented approximately once a decade
by physicists believing their research to be original (present author not excepted)”. Such derivations involve
additional assumptions, most commonly that the Lorentz transformations form a group.
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all possible physical experiments. The problem with “Aristotle’s second law” — all bodies
persist in their state of rest unless acted on by an external force (Wigner, as quoted in Brading
& Castellani, 2003, pg. 368) — is not that there is a lurking contradiction, nor is it that a
universe which obeyed such a law would be tossed to and fro by every physicist whim. The
problem is that it’s empirically false. The second postulate certainly isn’t necessary — there is
nothing logically contradictory about a universe that respects Galilean invariance. Similarly,
the Lagrangian in Equation (3) shows that we can formulate physical theories which do not
respect translational and rotational symmetry. As Wigner warns, “Einstein’s work established
the [principles underlying special relativity] so firmly that we have to be reminded that they
are based only on experience”.
General Relativity: We turn now to Stenger’s discussion of gravity.
“Ask yourself this: If the gravitational force can be transformed away by go-
ing to a different reference frame, how can it be “real”? It can’t. We see that
the gravitational force is an artifact, a “fictitious” force just like the centrifugal
and Coriolis forces . . . [If there were no gravity] then there would be no universe
. . . [P]hysicists have to put gravity into any model of the universe that contains
separate masses. A universe with separated masses and no gravity would violate
point-of-view invariance. . . . In general relativity, the gravitational force is treated
as a fictitious force like the centrifugal force, introduced into models to preserve
invariance between reference frames accelerating with respect to one another.”
These claims are mistaken. The existence of gravity is not implied by the existence of the
universe, separate masses or accelerating frames.
Stenger’s view may be rooted in the rather persistent myth that special relativity cannot
handle accelerating objects or frames, and so general relativity (and thus gravity) is required.
The best remedy to this view is some extra homework: sit down with the excellent textbook of
Hartle (2003) and don’t get up until you’ve finished Chapter 5’s “systematic way of extracting
the predictions for observers who are not associated with global inertial frames . . . in the
context of special relativity”. Special relativity is perfectly able to preserve invariance between
reference frames accelerating with respect to one another. Physicists clearly don’t have to
put gravity into any model of the universe that contains separate masses.
We can see this another way. None of the invariant/covariant properties of general rela-
tivity depend on the value of Newton’s constant G. In particular, we can set G = 0. In such
a universe, the geometry of spacetime would not be coupled to its matter-energy content,
and Einstein’s equation would read Rµν = 0. With no source term, local Lorentz invariance
holds globally, giving the Minkowski metric of special relativity. Neither logical necessity nor
PoVI demands the coupling of spacetime geometry to mass-energy. This G = 0 universe is a
counterexample to Stenger’s assertion that no gravity means no universe.
What of Stenger’s claim that general relativity is merely a fictitious force, to can be derived
from PoVI and “one or two additional assumptions”? Interpreting PoVI as what Einstein
called general covariance, PoVI tells us almost nothing. General relativity is not the only
covariant theory of spacetime (Norton, 1995). As Misner et al. (1973, pg. 302) note: “Any
physical theory originally written in a special coordinate system can be recast in geometric,
coordinate-free language. Newtonian theory is a good example, with its equivalent geometric
and standard formulations. Hence, as a sieve for separating viable theories from nonviable
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theories, the principle of general covariance is useless.” Similarly, Carroll (2003) tells us that
the principle “Laws of physics should be expressed (or at least be expressible) in generally
covariant form” is “vacuous”.
Suppose that, feeling generous, we allow Stenger to assume the equivalence principle10,
which is what he is referring to when he calls gravity a ‘fictitious force’. The problem is
that the equivalence principle applies to a limiting case: a freely falling frame, infinitesimally
small, observed for an infinitesimally short period of time. The most we can infer/guess from
this is that there exists a metric on spacetime which is locally Minkowskian, the curvature
of which we interpret as gravity, as well as the requirement that the coupling of matter to
curvature does not allow curvature to be measured locally (Carroll, 2003). This inference is
best described as a well-motivated suggestion rather than a rigorously derived consequence.
Now, how far are we from Einstein’s field equation? The most common next step in the
derivation is to turn our attention to the aspects of gravity which cannot be transformed
away, which are not fictitious11. Two observers falling toward the centre of the Earth inside a
lift will be able to distinguish their state of motion from that in an empty universe by the fact
that their paths are converging. Something appears to be pushing them together – a tidal
field. It follows that the presence of a genuine gravitation field, as opposed to an inertial field,
can be verified by the variation of the field. From this starting point, via a generalisation
of the equation of geodesic deviation from Newtonian gravity, we link the real, non-fictitious
properties of the gravitational field to Riemann tensor and its contractions. In this respect,
gravity is not a fictional force in the same sense that the centrifugal force is. We can always
remove the centrifugal force everywhere by transforming to an inertial frame. This cannot be
done for gravity.
We can now identify the “additional assumptions” that Stenger needs to derive general
relativity. Given general covariance (or PoVI), the additional assumptions constitute the
entire empirical content of the theory. Even if we assume the equivalence principle, we
need additional information about what the gravitational properties of matter actually do to
spacetime. These are the dynamic principles of spacetime, the very reasons why Einstein’s
theory can be called geometrodynamics. Stenger’s attempts to trivialise gravity thus fail. We
are free to consider the fine-tuning of gravity, both its existence and properties.
Finally, general relativity provides a perfect counterexample to Stenger’s conflation of
covariance with symmetry. Einstein’s GR field equation is covariant — it takes the same
form in any coordinate system, and applying a coordinate transformation to a particular
solution of the GR equation yields another solution, both representing the same physical
scenario. Thus, any solution of the GR equation is covariant, or PoVI. But it does not follow
10This is generosity indeed. The fact that the two cannonballs dropped (probably apocryphally) off the
Tower of Pisa by Galileo hit the ground at the same time is certainly not a necessary truth; neither does
follow from PoVI. This is an equivalence between two different experiments, not two different viewpoints. As
with Lorentz violation, considerable theoretical and observational effort has been expended in formulating and
testing equivalence-principle-violating theories (Uzan, 2011), guided by the realisation that ‘[d]espite its name,
the “Equivalence Principle” (EP) is not one of the basic principles of physics. There is nothing taboo about
having an observational violation of the EP’ (Damour, 2009).
11For example, Hartle (2003); D’Inverno (2004) take this approach via the Newtonian equation of geodesic
deviation. Wald (1984); Carroll (2003); Hobson et al. (2005); Rindler (2006) take a shortcut by guessing the
form of the Einstein equation from the (Newtonian) Poisson equation. Misner et al. (1973) present six sets of
axioms from which to derive Einstein’s equation, together with the warning that “[b]y now the equation tells
what axioms are acceptable”. Most of these books also derive the equation from a variational principle, which
relies heavily on simplicity as a guiding principle. In fact, the variational approach is the best way to explore
the “uncountable number” of ways in which general relativity could be modified (Carroll, 2003, pg. 181).
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that a particular solution will exhibit any symmetries. There may be no conserved quantities
at all. As Hartle (2003, pg. 176, 342) explains:
“Conserved quantities . . . cannot be expected in a general spacetime that has no
special symmetries . . . The conserved energy and angular momentum of particle
orbits in the Schwarzschild geometry12 followed directly from its time displacement
and rotational symmetries. . . . But general relativity does not assume a fixed
spacetime geometry. It is a theory of spacetime geometry, and there are no
symmetries that characterize all spacetimes.”
The Standard Model of Particle Physics and Gauge Invariance: We turn now to
particle physics, and particularly the gauge principle. Interpreting gauge invariance as “just
a fancy technical term for point-of-view invariance” [Foft 86], Stenger says:
“If [the phase of the wavefunction] is allowed to vary from point to point in space-
time, Schro¨dinger’s time-dependent equation . . . is not gauge invariant. However,
if you insert a four-vector field into the equation and ask what that field has to
be to make everything nice and gauge invariant, that field is precisely the four-
vector potential that leads to Maxwell’s equations of electromagnetism! That is,
the electromagnetic force turns out to be a fictitious force, like gravity, introduced
to preserve the point-of-view invariance of the system. . . . Much of the standard
model of elementary particles also follows from the principle of gauge invariance.”
[Foft 86-88]
Remember the point that Stenger is trying to make: the laws of nature are the same in any
universe which is point-of-view invariant.
Stenger’s discussion glosses over the major conceptual leap from global to local gauge
invariance. Most discussions of the gauge principle are rather cautious at this point. Yang,
who along with Mills first used the gauge principle as a postulate in a physical theory, com-
mented that “We did not know how to make the theory fit experiment. It was our judgement,
however, that the beauty of the idea alone merited attention”. Kaku (1993, pg. 11), who
provides this quote, says of the argument for local gauge invariance:
“If the predictions of gauge theory disagreed with the experimental data, then one
would have to abandon them, no matter how elegant or aesthetically satisfying
they were. Gauge theorists realized that the ultimate judge of any theory was
experiment.”
Similarly, Griffiths (2008) “knows of no compelling physical argument for insisting that global
invariance should hold locally” [emphasis original]. Aitchison & Hey (2002) says that this line
of thought is “not compelling motivation” for the step from global to local gauge invariance,
and along with Pokorski (2000), who describes the argument as aesthetic, ultimately appeals
to the empirical success of the principle for justification. Needless to say, these are not the
views of physicists demanding that all possible universes must obey a certain principle13.
12That is, the spacetime of a non-rotating, uncharged black hole.
13See also the excellent articles by Martin and Earman in Brading & Castellani (2003). Earman, in particular,
notes that the ‘gauge principle’ is viewed by Wald and Weinberg (et al.) as a consequence of other principles,
i.e. output rather than input.
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The argument most often advanced to justify local gauge invariance is that ‘local’ symme-
tries are more in line with the locality of special relativity (i.e. no faster-than-light propagation
of physical causes), in that we are letting each spacetime point choose its own phase conven-
tion. This argument, however, seems to contradict itself. We begin by postulating that the
phase of the wavefunction is unobservable, from which follows global gauge invariance. The
idea that all spacetime points adopt the same phase convention seems contrary to locality.
This leads us to local gauge invariance. But the phase of the wavefunction isn’t a physical
cause. By hypothesis, the physical universe knows nothing of the phase of the wavefunction.
The very reason for global gauge invariance seems to suggest that nature needn’t be bothered
by local gauge invariance.
Secondly, we note again the difference between symmetry and PoVI. A universe described
by a Lagrangian that is not locally gauge invariant is not doomed to subjectivity. Stenger
notes that the Lagrangian for a free charged particle is not invariant under a local gauge
transformation — e.g. the Dirac field: L = ψ¯(iγµ∂µ − m)ψ. If Stenger’s claims were cor-
rect, one should be able to make “uselessly different” predictions from this Lagrangian using
nothing more than a relabelling of state space. We know, however that this cannot be done
because of the covariance of the Lagrangian formalism. Coordinate invariance is guaranteed
for any Lagrangian (that obeys the action principle), locally gauge invariant or not. This is
especially true of the phase of the wavefunction because it is unobservable in principle.
Thirdly, a technicality regarding local gauge invariance in QED. The relevant Lagrangian
is:




The gauge argument starts with the first term on the right hand side, the Dirac field for a
free electron. Noting that this term is not locally gauge invariant, we ask what term must
be added in order to restore invariance. We postulate that the second term is required,
which is describes the interaction between the electron and a field, Aµ. Noting that this
field has the same gauge properties as the electromagnetic field, we add the third term, the
Maxwellian term. The term in Fµν ≡ ∂µAν − ∂νAµ gives the source-free Maxwell equations
of electromagnetism.
A few points need to be kept in mind. a.) The second term is not unique. There are
infinitely many other gauge invariant terms which could be added. The term shown above is
singled out as being the simplest, renormalisable, Lorentz and gauge invariant term. Simplicity
is not necessity. b.) Local gauge invariance does not demand that we add the third term. It
is consistent with local gauge invariance that Fµν ≡ 0, which implies a non-physical, formal
coupling of the matter field to trivial gauge fields (Brading & Castellani, 2003; Healey, 2007).
By adding the third term, we have promoted the gauge field to a physical field by hand. This is
a plausible step, a useful heuristic, but not a logical necessity. c.) Stenger claims that Dyson
(1990) “provided a derivation of Maxwell’s equations from the Lorentz force law. . . . That is,
Maxwell’s equations follow from the definition of the electric and magnetic fields”. Stenger
fails to mention a few crucial details of the proof. Dyson assumes the following commutation
relations: [xj , xk] = 0, m[xj , x˙k] = i~δjk . These are the conditions for the classical system
to be quantizable, and are highly non-trivial. Hojman & Shepley (1991) shows that these
assumptions (plus Newton’s equation mx¨ = Fj(x, x˙, t)) are equivalent to the Euler-Lagrange
equations of a Lagrangian L, and gives examples of classical equations that do not fulfil these
assumptions. Also, Dyson only proves two of Maxwell’s equations, assuming that the other
two (∇ · E = 4piρ, -∂E/∂t + ∇ × B = 4pij) can be used to define the charge and current
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density. As a number of authors (Anderson, 1991; Brehme, 1991; Dombey, 1991; Farquhar,
1991; Vaidya, 1991) were quick to point out, this is also a non-trivial assumption. In particular,
in response to the comment of Dyson (1990) that Galilean and Lorentz invariance seem to be
coexisting peacefully in his derivation, it is noted that Lorentz invariance has been assumed in
the “definitions”. If Dyson had chosen different definitions of the charge and current density,
he could have made the equations Galilean invariant. Alternatively, had Dyson replaced E
with E/
√
1− |E|2, then Coulomb’s law would not hold. Evidently, this is no mere change of
convention.
Fourthly, we must ask: what else does a gauge theory need to postulate, other than local
gauge invariance? A gauge theory needs a symmetry group. Electromagnetism is based on
U(1), the weak force SU(2), the strong force SU(3), and there are grand unified theories based
on SU(5), SO(10), E8 and more. These are just the theories with a chance of describing our
universe. From a theoretical point of view, there are any number of possible symmetries, e.g.
SU(N) and SO(N) for any integer N (Schellekens, 2008). The gauge group of the standard
model, SU(3)× SU(2)× U(1), is far from unique.
Finally, there is a deeper point that needs to be made about observable and unobserv-
able quantities in physical theories. Our foray into gauge invariance was prompted by the
unobservability of the phase of the wavefunction. This is not a mathematical fact about our
theory. One cannot derive this fact from mathematical theorems about Hilbert space. It is
an empirical fact, and a highly non-trivial one. It is the claim that there is no possible exper-
iment, no observation of any kind anywhere in the universe that could measure the phase of
a wavefunction. Stenger’s casual observation that the probability interpretation of the state
vector in quantum mechanics is an additional assumption [Foft 88] fails to acknowledge
the empirical significance of this postulate — this is the postulate underlying global gauge
invariance, not PoVI. Here is Brading and Brown (in Brading & Castellani, 2003, pg. 99):
“The very fact that a global gauge transformation does not lead to empirically
distinct predictions is itself non-trivial. In other words, the freedom in our de-
scriptions is no ‘mere’ mathematical freedom — it is a consequence of a physically
significant structural feature of the theory. The same is true in the case of global
spacetime symmetries: the fact that the equations of motion are invariant under
translations, for example, is empirically significant.” [Emphasis original.]
All physical theories must posit a correspondence between their mathematical apparatus
and the physical world that they are attempting to describe. A good illustration of this
point is the very first gauge theory. In 1918, Weyl considered the geometry that results
from extending Einstein’s theory of general relativity by allowing arbitrary rescalings of the
spacetime metric at each spacetime point14, coining the term ‘gauge’ symmetry for this kind
of transformation. At the heart of Weyl’s idea was the assumption that the spacetime interval
(ds2) was unobservable, and had no physical significance. While Weyl’s project showed some
promising signs — the gauge field could be identified with the electromagnetic field — Einstein
soon pointed out its central flaw. The spacetime interval was observable, in the form of
spectral lines from atoms in distant stars and nebulae.
The moral of the story is simple but profound: the line that separates observable and
unobservable in a physical theories is drawn by nature, not by us. The problem with Weyl’s
first attempt at a gauge theory is not mathematical i.e. there is no internal inconsistency.
14My account here will follow Martin (in Brading & Castellani, 2003).
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Neither is the problem one of subjectivity, or uselessly different predictions. The problem is
that the theory makes objective, point-of-view invariant predictions that are false.
Conclusion: We can now see the flaw in Stenger’s argument. Premise LN1 should read: If
our formulation of the laws of nature is to be objective, then it must be covariant. Premise
LN2 should read: symmetries imply conserved quantities. Since ‘covariant’ and ‘symmetric’
are not synonymous, it follows that the conclusion of the argument is unproven, and we would
argue that it is false. The conservation principles of this universe are not merely principles
governing our formulation of the laws of nature. Neother’s theorems do not allow us to pull
physically significant conclusions out of a mathematical hat. If you want to know whether
a certain symmetry holds in nature, you need a laboratory or a telescope, not a blackboard.
Symmetries tell us something about the physical universe.
Some of our comments may seem to be nit-picking over mere technicalities. On the con-
trary, those attempting the noble task of attacking Hilbert’s 6th problem — to find the
axioms of physics — will be disqualified if they are found to be smuggling secret assump-
tions. Nitpicking and mere technicalities are the name of the game: Russell and Whitehead’s
Principia Mathematica proved that “1 + 1 = 2” on page 86 of Volume II. Stenger’s extraor-
dinary claim that only one axiom is needed — the near-trivial requirement that our theories
describe an objective reality — dies the death of a thousand overlooked assumptions. The
folly of Stenger’s account of modern physics is most clear in his claim to be able to deduce
all of classical mechanics, Newton’s law of gravity, Maxwell’s equations of electromagnetism,
special relativity, general relativity, quantum mechanics, and the standard model of particle
physics from one principle. These theories are based on contradictory principles, and make
contradictory predictions, reducing Stenger’s argument to ashes.
4.1.2 Is Symmetry Enough?
Suppose that Stenger were correct regarding symmetries, that any objective description of
the universe must incorporate them. One of the features of the universe as we currently
understand it is that it is not perfectly symmetric. Indeed, intelligent life requires a measure
of asymmetry. For example, the perfect homogeneity and isotropy of the Robertson-Walker
spacetime precludes the possibility of any form of complexity, including life. Sakharov (1967)
famously showed that for the universe to contain sufficient amounts of ordinary baryonic
matter, interactions in the early universe must violate baryon number conservation, charge-
symmetry and charge-parity-symmetry, and must spend some time out of thermal equilibrium.
Supersymmetry, too, must be a broken symmetry in any life-permitting universe, since the
bosonic partner of the electron (the selectron) would make chemistry impossible (see the
discussion in Susskind, 2005, pg. 250). As Pierre Curie has said, it is asymmetry that creates
a phenomena.
One of the most important concepts in modern physics is spontaneous symmetry breaking
(SSB). As Strocchi (2007) explains, SSB forms the basis for recent achievements in statistical
mechanics, describes collective phenomena in solid state physics, and makes possible the
unification of the weak, strong and electromagnetic forces of particle physics. The power of
SSB is precisely that it allows us
“. . . to understand how the conclusions of the Noether theorem can be evaded and
how a symmetry of the dynamics cannot be realized as a mapping of the physical
configurations of the system.” (Strocchi, 2007, pg. 3)
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SSB allows the laws of nature to retain their symmetry and yet have asymmetric solutions.
Even if the symmetries of the laws of nature were inevitable, it would still be an open question
as to precisely which symmetries were broken in our universe and which were unbroken.
4.1.3 Changing the Laws of Nature
What if the laws of nature were different? Stenger says:
“. . . what about a universe with a different set of “laws”? There is not much we
can say about such a universe, nor do we need to. Not knowing what any of their
parameters are, no one can claim that they are fine-tuned.” [Foft 69]
In reply, fine-tuning isn’t about what the parameters and laws are in a particular universe.
Given some other set of laws, we ask: if a universe were chosen at random from the set
of universes with those laws, what is the probability that it would support intelligent life?
If that probability is suitably (and robustly) small, then we conclude that that region of
possible-physics-space contributes negligibly to the total life-permitting subset. It is easy to
find examples of such claims.
• A universe governed by Maxwell’s Laws “all the way down” (i.e. with no quantum
regime at small scales) will not have stable atoms — electrons radiate their kinetic
energy and spiral rapidly into the nucleus — and hence no chemistry (Barrow & Tipler,
1986, pg. 303). We don’t need to know what the parameters are to know that life in
such a universe is plausibly impossible.
• If electrons were bosons, rather than fermions, then they would not obey the Pauli
exclusion principle. There would be no chemistry.
• If gravity were repulsive rather than attractive, then matter wouldn’t clump into com-
plex structures. Remember: your density, thank gravity, is 1030 times greater than the
average density of the universe.
• If the strong force were a long rather than short-range force, then there would be no
atoms. Any structures that formed would be uniform, spherical, undifferentiated lumps,
of arbitrary size and incapable of complexity.
• If, in electromagnetism, like charges attracted and opposites repelled, then there would
be no atoms. As above, we would just have undifferentiated lumps of matter.
• The electromagnetic force allows matter to cool into galaxies, stars, and planets. With-
out such interactions, all matter would be like dark matter, which can only form into
large, diffuse, roughly spherical haloes of matter whose only internal structure consists
of smaller, diffuse, roughly spherical subhaloes.
The same idea seems to be true of laws in very different contexts. John Conway’s mar-
vellous ‘Game of Life’ uses very simple rules, but allows some very complex and fascinating
patterns. In fact, one can build a universal Turing machine. Yet the simplicity of these rules
didn’t come for free. Conway had to search for it (Guy, 2008, pg. 37):
“His discovery of the Game of Life was effected only after the rejection of many
patterns, triangular and hexagonal lattices as well as square ones, and of many
other laws of birth and death, including the introduction of two and even three











Figure 1: The “wedge”: x and y are two
physical parameters that can vary up to
some xmax and ymax, where we can al-
low these values to approach infinity if
so desired. The point (x0, y0) represents
the values of x and y in our universe.
The life-permitting range is the shaded
wedge. Varying only one parameter at a
time only explores that part of parame-
ter space which is vertically or horizon-
tally adjacent to (x0, y0), thus missing
most of parameter space.
graduate students shuffled poker chips, foreign coins, cowrie shells, Go stones, or
whatever came to hand, until there was a viable balance between life and death.”
It seems plausible that, even in the space of cellular automata, the set of laws that permit the
emergence and persistence of complexity is a very small subset of all possible laws. Note that
the question is not whether Conway’s Life is unique in having interesting properties. The
point is that, however many ways there are of being interesting, there are vastly many more
ways of being trivially simple or utterly chaotic.
We should be cautious, however. Whatever the problems of defining the possible range
of a given parameter, we are in a significantly more nebulous realm when we try to consider
the set of all possible physical laws. It is not clear how such a fine-tuning case could be
formalised, whatever its intuitive appeal.
4.2 The Wedge
Moving from the laws of nature to the parameters those laws, Stenger makes the following
general argument against supposed examples of fine-tuning:
“[T]he examples of fine-tuning given in the theist literature . . . vary one parameter
while holding all the rest constant. This is both dubious and scientifically shoddy.
As we shall see in several specific cases, changing one or more other parameters
can often compensate for the one that is changed.” [Foft 70]
To illustrate this point, Stenger introduces “the wedge”. I have produced my own version
in Figure 1. Here, x and y are two physical parameters that can vary from zero to xmax and
ymax, where we can allow these values to approach infinity if so desired. The point (x0, y0)
represents the values of x and y in our universe. The life-permitting range is the shaded
wedge. Stenger’s point is that varying only one parameter at a time only explores that part
of parameter space which is vertically or horizontally adjacent to (x0, y0), thus missing most of
parameter space. The probability of a life-permitting universe, assuming that the probability
distribution is uniform in (x, y) — which, as Stenger notes, is “the best we can do” [Foft
72] — is the ratio of the area inside the wedge to the area inside the dashed box.
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4.2.1 The Wedge is a Straw Man
In response, fine-tuning relies on a number of independent life-permitting criteria. Fail any
of these criteria, and life becomes dramatically less likely, if not impossible. When parameter
space is explored in the scientific literature, it rarely (if ever) looks like the wedge. We instead
see many intersecting wedges. Here are two examples.
Barr & Khan (2007) explored the parameter space of a model in which up-type and
down-type fermions acquire mass from different Higgs doublets. As a first step, they vary the
masses of the up and down quarks. The natural scale for these masses ranges over 60 orders
of magnitude and is illustrated in Figure 2 (top left). The upper limit is provided by the
Planck scale; the lower limit from dynamical breaking of chiral symmetry by QCD; see Barr
& Khan (2007) for a justification of these values. Figure 2 (top right) zooms in on a region
of parameter space, showing boundaries of 9 independent life-permitting criteria:
1. Above the blue line, there is only one stable element, which consists of a single particle
∆++. This element has the chemistry of helium — an inert, monatomic gas (above 4
K) with no known stable chemical compounds.
2. Above this red line, the deuteron is strongly unstable, decaying via the strong force.
The first step in stellar nucleosynthesis in hydrogen burning stars would fail.
3. Above the green curve, neutrons in nuclei decay, so that hydrogen is the only stable
element.
4. Below this red curve, the diproton is stable15. Two protons can fuse to helium-2 via a
very fast electromagnetic reaction, rather than the much slower, weak nuclear pp-chain.
5. Above this red line, the production of deuterium in stars absorbs energy rather than
releasing it. Also, the deuterium is unstable to weak decay.
6. Below this red line, a proton in a nucleus can capture an orbiting electron and become
a neutron. Thus, atoms are unstable.
7. Below the orange curve, isolated protons are unstable, leaving no hydrogen left over
from the early universe to power long-lived stars and play a crucial role in organic
chemistry.
8. Below this green curve, protons in nuclei decay, so that any atoms that formed would
disintegrate into a cloud of neutrons.
9. Below this blue line, the only stable element consists of a single particle ∆−, which
can combine with a positron to produce an element with the chemistry of hydrogen. A
15This may not be as clear-cut a disaster as is often asserted in the fine-tuning literature, going back to
Dyson (1971). MacDonald & Mullan (2009) and Bradford (2009) have shown that the binding of the diproton
is not sufficient to burn all the hydrogen to helium in big bang nucleosynthesis. For example, MacDonald &
Mullan (2009) show that while an increase in the strength of the strong force by 13% will bind the diproton, a
∼ 50% increase is needed to significantly affect the amount of hydrogen left over for stars. Also, Collins (2003)
has noted that the decay of the diproton will happen too slowly for the resulting deuteron to be converted into
helium, leaving at least some deuterium to power stars and take the place of hydrogen in organic compounds.
Finally with regard to stars, Phillips (1999, pg. 118) notes that: “It is sometimes suggested that the timescale
for hydrogen burning would be shorter if it were initiated by an electromagnetic reaction instead of the weak
nuclear reaction [as would be the case is the diproton were bound]. This is not the case, because the overall
rate for hydrogen burning is determined by the rate at which energy can escape from the star, i.e. by its
opacity, If hydrogen burning were initiated by an electromagnetic reaction, this reaction would proceed at
about the same rate as the weak reaction, but at a lower temperature and density.” However, stars in such a
universe would be significantly different to our own, and detailed predictions for their formation and evolution
have not been investigated.
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handful of chemical reactions are possible, with their most complex product being (an
analogue of) H2.
A second example comes from cosmology. Figure 2 (bottom row) comes from Tegmark
et al. (2006). It shows the life-permitting range for two slices through cosmological parameter
space. The parameters shown are: the cosmological constant Λ (expressed as an energy
density ρΛ in Planck units), the amplitude of primordial fluctuations Q, and the matter to
photon ratio ξ. A star indicates the location of our universe, and the white region shows
where life can form. The left panel shows ρΛ vs. Q
3ξ4. The red region shows universes that
are plausibly life-prohibiting — too far to the right and no cosmic structure forms; stray
too low and cosmic structures are not dense enough to form stars and planets; too high and
cosmic structures are too dense to allow long-lived stable planetary systems. Note well the
logarithmic scale — the lack of a left boundary to the life-permitting region is because we have
scaled the axis so that ρΛ = 0 is at x = −∞. The universe re-collapses before life can form
for ρΛ . −10−121 (Peacock, 2007). The right panel shows similar constraints in the Q vs. ξ
space. We see similar constraints relating to the ability of galaxies to successfully form stars
by fragmentation due to gas cooling and for the universe to form anything other than black
holes. Note that we are changing ξ while holding ξbaryon constant, so the left limit of the plot
is provided by the condition ξ ≥ ξbaryon. See Table 4 of Tegmark et al. (2006) for a summary
of 8 anthropic constraints on the 7 dimensional parameter space (α, β,mp, ρΛ, Q, ξ, ξbaryon).
Examples could be multiplied, and the restriction to a 2D slice through parameter space
is due to the inconvenient unavailability of higher dimensional paper. These two examples
show that the wedge, by only considering a single life-permitting criterion, seriously distorts
typical cases of fine-tuning by committing the sequential juggler fallacy (Section 2). Stenger
further distorts the case for fine-tuning by saying:
“In the fine-tuning view, there is no wedge and the point has infinitesimal area,
so the probability of finding life is zero.” [Foft 70]
No reference is given, and this statement is not true of the scientific literature. The wedge is
a straw man.
4.2.2 The Straw Man is Winning
The wedge, distortion that it is, would still be able to support a fine-tuning claim. The proba-
bility calculated by varying only one parameter is actually an overestimate of the probability
calculated using the full wedge. Suppose the full life-permitting criterion that defines the
wedge is,
1−  ≤ y/x
y0/x0
≤ 1 +  , (5)
where  is a small number quantifying the allowed deviation from the value of y/x in our
universe. Now suppose that we hold x constant at its value in our universe. We conservatively
estimate the possible range of y by y0. Then, the probability of a life-permitting universe
is Py = 2. Now, if we calculate the probability over the whole wedge, we find that Pw ≤
/(1 + ) ≈ , where we have an upper limit because we have ignored the area with y inside
∆y, as marked in Figure 1. Thus16 Py ≥ Pw.
16Note that this is independent of xmax and ymax, and in particular holds in the limit xmax, ymax →∞.
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Figure 2: Top row : the left panel shows the parameter space of the masses of the up and
down quark. Note that the axes are loge not log10; the axes span ∼ 60 orders of magnitude.
The right panel shows a zoom-in of the small box. The lines show the limits of different
life-permitting criteria, as calculated by Barr & Khan (2007) and explained in the text. The
small green region marked “potentially viable” shows where all these constraints are satisfied.
Bottom Row : Anthropic limits on some cosmological variables: the cosmological constant Λ
(expressed as an energy density ρΛ in Planck units), the amplitude of primordial fluctuations
Q, and the matter to photon ratio ξ. The white region shows where life can form. The
coloured regions show where various life-permitting criteria are not fulfilled, as explained in
the text. Figure from Tegmark et al. (2006).
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It is thus not necessarily “scientifically shoddy” to vary only one variable. Indeed, as
scientists we must make these kind of assumptions all the time — the question is how accurate
they are. Under fairly reasonable assumptions (uniform probability etc.), varying only one
variable provides a useful estimate of the relevant probability. The wedge thus commits the
flippant funambulist fallacy (Section 2). If  is small enough, then the wedge is a tightrope.
We have opened up more parameter space in which life can form, but we have also opened
up more parameter space in which life cannot form. As Dawkins (1986) has rightly said:
“however many ways there may be of being alive, it is certain that there are vastly more ways
of being dead, or rather not alive”.
How could this conclusion be avoided? Perhaps the life-permitting region magically weaves
its way around the regions left over from the vary-one-parameter investigation. The other
alternative is to hope for a non-uniform prior probability. One can show that a power-law
prior has no significant effect on the wedge. Any other prior raises a problem, as explained
by Aguirre in Carr (2007):
“. . . it is assumed that [the prior] is either flat or a simple power law, without
any complicated structure. This can be done just for simplicity, but it is often
argued to be natural. The flavour of this argument is as follows. If [the prior] is to
have an interesting structure over the relatively small range in which observers are
abundant, there must be a parameter of order the observed [one] in the expression
for [the prior]. But it is precisely the absence of this parameter that motivated
the anthropic approach.”
In short, to significantly change the probability of a life-permitting universe, we would need
a prior that centres close to the observed value, and has a narrow peak. But this simply
exchanges one fine-tuning for two — the centre and peak of the distribution.
There is, however, one important lesson to be drawn from the wedge. If we vary x only and
calculate Px, and then vary y only and calculate Py, we must not simply multiply Pw = Px Py.
This will certainly underestimate the probability inside the wedge, assuming that there is only
a single wedge.
4.3 Entropy
We turn now to cosmology. The problem of the apparently low entropy of the universe is one
of the oldest problems of cosmology. The fact that the entropy of the universe is not at its
theoretical maximum, coupled with the fact that entropy cannot decrease, means that the
universe must have started in a very special, low entropy state. Stenger replies as follows.
Bekenstein (1973) and Hawking (1975) showed that a black hole has an entropy equal to a




= piR2S , (6)
where RS is the radius of the black hole event horizon, the Schwarzschild radius. Now, instead
of a black hole, suppose we consider an expanding universe of radius RH = c/H, where H is
the Hubble parameter. The “Schwarzschild radius” of the observable universe is
RS = 2M =
8pi
3
ρR3H = RH , (7)
where we have used the Friedmann equation, H2 = 8piρ/3, and ρ “is the sum of all the con-
tributions to the mass/energy of the universe: matter, radiation, curvature, and cosmological
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constant” [Foft 111]. Thus, the observable universe has entropy equal to a black hole of the
same radius. In particular, if the universe starts out at the Planck time as a sphere of radius
equal to the Planck length, then its entropy is as great as it could possibly be, equal to that
of a Planck-sized black hole.
Now, consider a region of radius R (and volume V ) inside the expanding universe. The
maximum entropy is given by SBH(R) (Equation 6), while the actual entropy is the region’s
share (by volume) of the total entropy of the observable universe. The difference between
maximum and actual entropy is









Thus, the expansion of the universe opens up regions of size R, smaller than the observable
universe. In such regions, the expansion of the universe opens up an entropy gap. “As long as
R < RH , order can form without violating the second law of thermodynamics” [Foft 113].
Note that Stenger’s proposed solution requires only two ingredients — the initial, high-
entropy state, and the expansion of the universe to create an entropy gap. In particular,
Stenger is not appealing to inflation to solve the entropy problem. We will do the same in
this section, coming to a discussion of inflation later.
There are good reasons to be sceptical. This solution to one of the deepest problems
in physics — the origin of the second law of thermodynamics and the arrow of time — is
suspiciously missing from the scientific literature. Stenger is not reporting the consensus
of the scientific community; neither is he using rough approximations to summarise a more
careful, more technical calculation that has passed peer review.
Applying the Bekenstein limit to a cosmological spacetime is not nearly as straightforward
as Stenger implies. The Bekenstein limit applies to the event horizon of a black hole. The
Hubble radius RH is not any kind of horizon. It is the distance at which the proper recession
velocity of the Hubble flow is equal to the speed of light. There is no causal limit associated
with the Hubble radius as information and particles can pass both ways, and can reach the
observer at the origin (Davis & Lineweaver, 2004). Further, given that the entropy in question
is associated with the surface area of an event horizon, it not obvious that one can distribute
said entropy uniformly over the enclosed volume, as in Equation 8.
Even in terms of the Hubble radius, Stenger’s calculation is mistaken. Stenger says that
ρ is “the sum of all the contributions to the mass/energy of the universe: matter, radiation,
curvature, and cosmological constant”. This is incorrect. Specifically, there is no such thing
as curvature energy. The term involving the curvature in the Friedmann equation does not
represent a form of energy; it comes from the geometry side of the Einstein equation, not
the energy-momentum side. Curvature energy is “just a notational sleight of hand” (Carroll,
2003, pg. 338). Remember that the curvature in question is space curvature, not spacetime
curvature, and thus has no coordinate independent meaning. More generally, there is no such
thing as gravitational energy in general relativity (Misner et al., 1973, pg. 467). Equation
7 only holds if the universe is exactly flat, and thus Stenger has at best traded the entropy
problem for the flatness problem.
What if we consider the cosmic event horizon instead of the Hubble radius? The (comoving
distance to the) event horizon in an FLRW spacetime is given by dE =
∫∞
0 c dt/a(t), where
a(t) is the scale factor of the universe. This integral may not converge, in which case there
is no event horizon. In the concordance model of cosmology, it does converge thanks to the
cosmological constant. Its value is around dE ≈ 20 Gpc comoving, which corresponds to a
24
physical scale of around 3× 10−5m at the Planck time. It is then not true that at the Planck
time the “Schwarzschild radius” of the universe (around 3 × 10−35 metres) is equal to the
distance to its event horizon.
Perhaps we should follow the advice of Bekenstein (1989) and consider the particle horizon
at the Planck time, defined by dp(tPl) =
∫ tPl
0 c dt/a(t). This is, in general, not equal to the
Hubble radius, though if the universe is radiation dominated in its earliest stages then the two
are actually equal. The problem now is somewhat deeper. The reason that we are considering
the Planck time is that we would need a quantum theory of spacetime to be able to predict
what happened before this time. In fact, our best guess is that classical notions of spacetime
are meaningless before tPl, to be replaced with a quantum spacetime “foam”. However, the
definition of dp requires us to integrate a(t) from t = 0 to tPl. The very reason that we
are considering the universe at tPl is therefore sufficient reason to reject the validity of our
calculation of the particle horizon.
There is no consensus on how to correctly apply the Bekenstein limit to cosmology. Beken-
stein (1989), as noted above, argued that one should apply the black hole entropy bound to
the particle horizon of the universe. Gibbons & Hawking (1977) and Davies (1988) considered
the thermodynamic properties of cosmic event horizons; Davis et al. (2003) noted that not
all FLRW spacetimes respect the generalised second law of thermodynamics. There are other
ways of formulating the entropy bound on a cosmological region. For example, Brustein &
Veneziano (2000) formulate the causal entropy bound on space-like hypersurfaces. The re-
view of Bousso (2002) notes that “a naive generalisation of the spherical entropy bound is
unsuccessful. . . . [T]he idea that the area of surfaces generally bounds the entropy in enclosed
spatial volumes has proven wrong. . . . [A] general entropy bound, if found, is no triviality”.
Bousso defends the covariant entropy bound, defined using light sheets in general relativity.
Further problems arise even if we assume that Stenger’s argument is correct. Stenger
has asked us to consider the universe at the Planck time, and in particular a region of the
universe that is the size of the Planck length. Let’s see what happens to this comoving volume
as the universe expands. 13.7 billion years of (concordance model) expansion will blow up
this Planck volume until it is roughly the size of a grain of sand. A single Planck volume in
a maximum entropy state at the Planck time is a good start but hardly sufficient. To make
our universe, we would need around 1090 such Planck volumes, all arranged to transition to
a classical expanding phase within a temporal window 100,000 times shorter than the Planck
time17. This brings us to the most serious problem with Stenger’s reply.
Let’s remind ourselves of what the entropy problem is, as expounded by Penrose (1979).
Consider our universe at t1 = one second after the big bang. Spacetime is remarkably smooth,
represented by the Robertson-Walker metric to better than one part in 105. Now run the clock
forward. The tiny inhomogeneities grow under gravity, forming deeper and deeper potential
wells. Some will collapse into black holes, creating singularities in our once pristine spacetime.
Now suppose that the universe begins to recollapse. Unless the collapse of the universe were
to reverse the arrow of time18, entropy would continue to increase, creating more and larger
17This requirement is set by the homogeneity of our universe. Regions that transition early will expand and
dilute, and so for the entire universe to be homogeneous to within Q ≈ 10−5, the regions must begin their
classical phase within ∆t ≈ Qt.
18This seems very unlikely. Regions of the universe which have collapsed and virialised have decoupled from
the overall expansion of the universe, and so would have no way of knowing exactly when the expansion stalled
and reversed. However, as Price (1997) lucidly explains, such arguments risk invoking a double standard, as
they work just as well when applied backwards in time.
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inhomogeneities and black holes as structures collapse and collide. If we freeze the universe
at t2 = one second before the big crunch, we see a spacetime that is highly inhomogeneous,
littered with lumps and bumps, and pockmarked with singularities.
Penrose’s reasoning is very simple. If we started at t1 with an extremely homogeneous
spacetime, and then allowed a few billion years of entropy increasing processes to take their
toll, and ended at t2 with an extremely inhomogeneous spacetime, full of black holes, then
we must conclude that the t2 spacetime represents a significantly higher entropy state than
the t1 spacetime
19. We conclude that we know what a high entropy big bang spacetime looks
like, and it looks nothing like the state of our universe in its earliest stages. Why didn’t our
universe begin in a high entropy, highly inhomogeneous state? Why did our universe start
off in such a special, improbable, low-entropy state?
Let’s return to Stenger’s proposed solution. After introducing the relevant concepts, he
says [Foft 112]:
“. . . this does not mean that the local entropy is maximal. The entropy density of
the universe can be calculated. Since the universe is homogeneous, it will be the
same on all scales.”
Stenger takes it for granted that the universe is homogeneous and isotropic. We can see this
also in his use of the Friedmann equation, which assumes that spacetime is homogeneous and
isotropic. Not surprisingly, once homogeneity and isotropy have been assumed, Stenger finds
that the solution to the entropy problem is remarkably easy.
We conclude that Stenger has not only failed to solve the entropy problem; he has failed
to comprehend it. He has presented the problem itself as its solution. Homogeneous, isotropic
expansion cannot solve the entropy problem — it is the entropy problem. Stenger’s asser-
tion that “the universe starts out with maximum entropy or complete disorder” is false. A
homogeneous, isotropic spacetime is an incredibly low entropy state. Penrose (1989) warned
of precisely this brand of failed solution two decades ago:
“Virtually all detailed investigations [of entropy and cosmology] so far have taken
the FRW models as their starting point, which, as we have seen, totally begs the
question of the enormous number of degrees of freedom available in the gravi-
tational field . . . The second law of thermodynamics arises because there was an
enormous constraint (of a very particular kind) placed on the universe at the be-
ginning of time, giving us the very low entropy that we need in order to start
things off.”
Cosmologists repented of such mistakes in the 1970’s and 80’s.
Stenger’s “biverse” [Foft 142] doesn’t solve the entropy problem either. Once again,
homogeneity and isotropy are simply assumed, with the added twist that instead of a low
entropy initial state, we have a low entropy middle state. This makes no difference — the
reason that a low entropy state requires explanation is that it is improbable. Moving the
improbable state into the middle does not make it any more probable. As Carroll (2008) notes,
“an unnatural low-entropy condition [that occurs] in the middle of the universe’s history (at
the bounce) . . . passes the buck on the question of why the entropy near what we call the big
bang was small”.20
19Recall that, if the two spacetimes can still be described on large scales by the Robertson-Walker metric,
then their large scale properties will be identical, except for the sign of the Hubble parameter.
20Foft 142 tells us that Carroll has actually raised this objection to Stenger, whose reply was to point out
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4.4 Inflation
4.4.1 Did Inflation Happen?
We turn now to cosmic inflation, which proposes that the universe underwent a period of
accelerated expansion in its earliest stages. The achievements of inflation are truly impressive
— in one fell swoop, the universe is sent on its expanding way, the flatness, horizon, and
monopole problem are solved and we have concrete, testable and seemingly correct predictions
for the origin of cosmic structure. It is a brilliant idea, and one that continues to defy all
attempts at falsification. Since life requires an almost-flat universe (Barrow & Tipler, 1986,
pg. 408ff.), inflation is potentially a solution to a particularly impressive fine-tuning problem
— sans inflation, the density of the universe at the Planck time must be tuned to 60 decimal
places in order for the universe to be life-permitting.
Inflation solves this fine-tuning problem by invoking a dynamical mechanism that drives
the universe towards flatness. The first question we must ask is: did inflation actually happen?
The evidence is quite strong, though not indubitable (Turok, 2002; Brandenberger, 2011).
There are a few things to keep in mind. Firstly, inflation isn’t a specific model as such; it is
a family of models which share the desirable trait of having an early epoch of accelerating
expansion. Inflation is an effect, rather than a cause. There is no physical theory that predicts
the form of the inflaton potential. Different potentials, and different initial conditions for the
same potential, will produce different predictions.
In spite of this, inflation does provide some robust predictions, that is, predictions shared
by a wide variety of inflationary potentials. The problem is that these predictions are not
unique to inflation. Inflation predicts a Gaussian random field of density fluctuations, but
thanks to the central limit theorem this is nothing particularly unique (Peacock, 1999, pg.
342, 503). Inflation predicts a nearly scale-invariant spectrum of fluctuations, but such a
spectrum was proposed for independent reasons by Harrison (1970) and Zel’dovich (1972) a
decade before inflation was proposed. Inflation is a clever solution of the flatness and horizon
problem, but could be rendered unnecessary by a quantum-gravity theory of initial conditions.
The evidence for inflation is impressive but circumstantial.
4.4.2 Can Inflation Explain Fine-tuning?
Note the difference between this section and the last. Is inflation itself fine-tuned? This is no
mere technicality — if the solution is just as fine-tuned as the problem, then no progress has
been made. Inflation, to set up a life-permitting universe, must do the following21:
I1. There must be an inflaton field. To make the expansion of the universe accelerate, there
must exist a form of energy (a field) capable of satisfying the so-called Slow Roll Approx-
imation (SRA), which is equivalent to requiring that the potential energy of the field is
much greater than its kinetic energy, giving the field negative pressure.
that the arrow of time always points away from the lowest entropy point, so we can always call that point the
beginning of the universe. Once again, Stenger fails to understand the problem. The question is not why the
low entropy state was at the beginning of the universe, but why the universe was ever in a low entropy state.
The second law of thermodynamics tells us that the most probable world is one in which the entropy is always
high, and thus has no significant entropy gradients. This is precisely what entropy quantifies. See Price (1997,
2006) for an excellent discussion of these issues.
21These requirements can be found in any good cosmology textbook, e.g. Peacock (1999); Mo et al. (2010).
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I2. Inflation must start. There must come a time in the history of the universe when the
energy density of the inflaton field dominates the total energy density of the universe,
dictating its dynamics.
I3. Inflation must last. While the inflaton field controls the dynamics of the expansion of the
universe, we need it to obey the slow roll conditions for a sufficiently long period of time.
The “amount of inflation” is usually quantified by Ne, the number of e-folds of the size
of the universe. To solve the horizon and flatness problems, this number must be greater
than ∼ 60.
I4. Inflation must end. The dynamics of the expansion of the universe will (if it expands
forever) eventually be dominated by the energy component with the most negative equa-
tion of state w = pressure / energy density. Matter has w = 0, radiation w = 1/3, and
typically during inflation, the inflaton field has w ≈ −1. Thus, once inflation takes over,
there must be some special reason for it to stop; otherwise, the universe would maintain
its exponential expansion and no complex structure would form.
I5. Inflation must end in the right way. Inflation will have exponentially diluted the mass-
energy density of the universe — it is this feature that allows inflation to solve the
monopole problem. Once we are done inflating the universe, we must reheat the universe,
i.e. refill it with ordinary matter. We must also ensure that the post-inflation field
doesn’t possess a large, negative potential energy, which would cause the universe to
quickly recollapse.
I6. Inflation must set up the right density perturbations. Inflation must result in a universe
that is very homogeneous, but not perfectly homogeneous. Inhomogeneities will grow
via gravitational instability to form cosmic structures. The level of inhomogeneity (Q) is
subject to anthropic constraints, which we will discuss in Section 4.5.
The question now is: which of these achievements come naturally to inflation, and which
need some careful tuning of the inflationary dials? I1 is a bare hypothesis — we know of no
deeper reason why there should be an inflaton field at all. It was hoped that the inflaton field
could be the Higgs field (Guth, 1981). Alas, it wasn’t to be, and it appears that the inflaton’s
sole raison d’eˆtre is to cause the universe’s expansion to briefly accelerate. There is no direct
evidence for the existence of the inflaton field.
We can understand many of the remaining conditions through the work of Tegmark (2005),
who considered a wide range of inflaton potentials using Gaussian random fields. The po-
tential is of the form V (φ) = m4vf(
φ
mh
), where mv and mh are the characteristic vertical and
horizontal mass scales, and f is a dimensionless function with values and derivatives of order
unity. For initial conditions, Tegmark “sprays starting points randomly across the potential
surface”. Figure 3 shows a typical inflaton potential.
Requirement I2 will be discussed in more detail below. For now we note that the inflaton
must either begin or be driven into a region in which the SRA holds in order for the universe
to inflate, as shown by the thick lines in Figure 3.
Requirement I3 comes rather naturally to inflation: Peacock (1999, pg. 337) shows that
the requirement that inflation produce a large number of e-folds is essentially the same as the
requirement that inflation happen in the first place (i.e. SRA), namely φstart  mPl. This
assumes that the potential is relatively smooth, and that inflation terminates at a value of
the field (φ) rather smaller than its value at the start. There is another problem lurking,
however. If inflation lasts for & 70 e-folds (for GUT scale inflation), then all scales inside
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Figure 3: An example of a randomly-
generated inflaton potential. Thick
lines show where the Slow Roll Ap-
proximation holds (SRA); thin lines
show where it fails. The stars show
four characteristic initial conditions.
Three-pointed: the inflaton starts out-
side the SRA regions and does not re-
enter, so there is no inflation. Four-
pointed: successful inflation. Inflation
will have a beginning, and end, and the
post-inflationary vacuum energy is suf-
ficiently small to allow the growth of
structure. Five-pointed: inflation oc-
curs, but the post-inflation field has a
large, negative potential energy, which
would cause the universe to quickly rec-
ollapse. Six-pointed: inflation never
ends, and the universe contains no or-
dinary matter and no structure. Figure
from Tegmark (2005).
the Hubble radius today started out with physical wavelength smaller than the Planck scale
at the beginning of inflation (Brandenberger, 2011). The predictions of inflation (especially
the spectrum of perturbations), which use general relativity and a semi-classical description
of matter, must omit relevant quantum gravitational physics. This is a major unknown —
transplanckian effects may even prevent the onset of inflation.
I4 is non-trivial. The inflaton potential (or, more specifically, the region of the inflaton
potential which actually determines the evolution of the field) must have a region in which
the slow-roll approximation does not hold. If the inflaton rolls into a local minimum (at φ0)
while the SRA still holds (which requires V (φ0)  m2Pl/8pi d2V/dφ2|φ0 Peacock, 1999, pg.
332), then inflation never ends.
Tegmark (2005) asks what fraction of initial conditions for the inflaton field are success-
ful, where success means that the universe inflates, inflation ends and the universes doesn’t
thereafter meet a swift demise via a big crunch. The result is shown in Figure 4. The thick
black line shows the “success rate” of inflation, for a model with mh/mPl as shown on the
x-axis and mv = 0.001mPl. (This value has been chosen to maximise the probability that
Q = Qobserved ≈ 2 × 10−5). The coloured curves show predictions for other cosmological
parameters. The lower coloured regions are for mv = 0.001mPl; the upper coloured regions
are for mv = mh. The success rate peaks at ∼ 0.1 percent, and drops rapidly as mh increases
or decreases away from mPl. Even with a scalar field, inflation is far from guaranteed.
If inflation ends, we need its energy to be converted into ordinary matter (Condition I5).
Inflation must not result in a universe filled with pure radiation or dark matter, which cannot
form complex structures. Typically, the inflaton will to dump its energy into radiation. The
temperature must be high enough to take advantage of baryon-number-violating physics for
baryogenesis, and for γ+γ → particle + antiparticle reactions to create baryonic matter, but
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Figure 4: The thick black line shows
the “success rate” of inflation, for a
model with mh/mPl as shown on the
x-axis and mv = 0.001mPl. (This value
has been chosen to maximise the prob-
ability of Q = Qobserved ≈ 2 × 10−5).
The success rate is at most ∼ 0.1%.
The other coloured curves show pre-
dictions for other cosmological parame-
ters. The lower coloured regions are for
mv = 0.001mPl; the upper coloured re-
gions are for mv = mh. Figure adapted
from Tegmark (2005).
low enough not to create magnetic monopoles. With no physical model of the inflaton, the
necessary coupling between the inflaton and ordinary matter/radiation is another postulate,
but not an implausible one.
Requirement I6 brought about the downfall of “old” inflation. When this version of
inflation ended, it did so in expanding bubbles. Each bubble is too small to account for the
homogeneity of the observed universe, and reheating only occurs when bubbles collide. As
the space between the bubbles is still inflating, homogeneity cannot be achieved. New models
of inflation have been developed which avoid this problem. More generally, the value of Q
that results from inflation depends on the potential and initial conditions. We will discuss Q
further in Section 4.5.
Perhaps the most pressing issue with inflation is hidden in requirement I2. Inflation is
supposed to provide a dynamical explanation for the seemingly very fine-tuned initial condi-
tions of the standard model of cosmology. But does inflation need special initial conditions?
Can inflation act on generic initial conditions and produce the apparently fine-tuned uni-
verse we observe today? Hollands & Wald (2002b)22 contend not, for the following reason.
Consider a collapsing universe. It would require an astonishing sequence of correlations and
coincidences for the universe, in its final stages, to suddenly and coherently convert all its
matter into a scalar field with just enough kinetic energy to roll to the top of its potential
and remain perfectly balanced there for long enough to cause a substantial era of “deflation”.
The region of final-condition-space that results from deflation is thus much smaller than the
region that does not result from deflation. Since the relevant physics is time-reversible23, we
can simply run the tape backwards and conclude that the initial-condition-space is dominated
by universes that fail to inflate.
Readers will note the similarity of this argument to Penrose’s argument from Section
4.3. This intuitive argument can be formalised using the work of Gibbons et al. (1987), who
developed the canonical measure on the set of solutions of Einstein’s equation of General
Relativity. A number of authors have used the Gibbons-Hawking-Stewart canonical measure
to calculate the probability of inflation; see Hawking & Page (1988), Gibbons & Turok (2008)
22See also the discussion in Kofman et al. (2002) and Hollands & Wald (2002a)
23Cosmic phase transitions are irreversible in the same sense that scrambling an egg is irreversible. The time
asymmetry is a consequence of low entropy initial conditions, not the physics itself (Penrose, 1989; Hollands
& Wald, 2002a).
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and references therein. We will summarise the work of Carroll & Tam (2010), who ask what
fraction of universes that evolve like our universe since matter-radiation equality could have
begun with inflation. Crucially, they consider the role played by perturbations:
“Perturbations must be sub-dominant if inflation is to begin in the first place
(Vachaspati & Trodden, 1999), and by the end of inflation only small quantum
fluctuations in the energy density remain. It is therefore a necessary (although
not sufficient) condition for inflation to occur that perturbations be small at early
times. . . . the fraction of realistic cosmologies that are eligible for inflation is
therefore P (inflation) ≈ 10−6.6×107 .”
Carroll & Tam casually note: “This is a small number”, and in fact an overestimate. A
negligibly small fraction of universes that resemble ours at late times experience an early
period of inflation. Carroll & Tam (2010) conclude that while inflation is not without its
attractions (e.g. it may give a theory of initial conditions a slightly easier target to hit at the
Planck scale), “inflation by itself cannot solve the horizon problem, in the sense of making the
smooth early universe a natural outcome of a wide variety of initial conditions”. Note that
this argument also shows that inflation, in and of itself, cannot solve the entropy problem24.
Let’s summarise. Inflation is a wonderful idea; in many ways it seems irresistible (Liddle,
1995). However, we do not have a physical model, and even we had such a model, “although
inflationary models may alleviate the “fine tuning” in the choice of initial conditions, the
models themselves create new “fine tuning” issues with regard to the properties of the scalar
field” (Hollands & Wald, 2002b). To pretend that the mere mention of inflation makes a
life-permitting universe “100 percent” inevitable [Foft 245] is na¨ıve in the extreme, a cane
toad solution. For a popular-level discussion of many of the points raised in our discussion of
inflation, see Steinhardt (2011).
4.4.3 Inflation as a Case Study
Suppose that inflation did solve the fine-tuning of the density of the universe. Is it reasonable
to hope that all fine-tuning cases could be solved in a similar way? We contend not, because
inflation has a target. Let’s consider the range of densities that the universe could have had
at some point in its early history. One of these densities is physically singled out as special —
the critical density25. Now let’s note the range of densities that permit the existence of cosmic
structure in a long-lived universe. We find that this range is very narrow. Very conveniently,
this range neatly straddles the critical density.
We can now see why inflation has a chance. There is in fact a three-fold coincidence — A:
the density needed for life, B: the critical density, and C: the actual density of our universe are
all aligned. B and C are physical parameters, and so it is possible that some physical process
can bring the two into agreement. The coincidence between A and B then creates the required
anthropic coincidence (A and C). If, for example, life required a universe with a density (say,
just after reheating) 10 times less than critical, then inflation would do a wonderful job of
making all universes uninhabitable.
24We should also note that Carroll & Tam (2010) argue that the Gibbons-Hawking-Stewart canonical measure
renders an inflationary solution to the flatness problem superfluous. This is a puzzling result — it would seem
to show that non-flat FLRW universes are infinitely unlikely, so to speak. This result has been noted before.
See Gibbons & Turok (2008) for a different point of view.
25We use the Hubble constant to specify the particular time being considered.
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Inflation thus represents a very special case. Waiting inside the life-permitting range (L)
is another physical parameter (p). Aim for p and you will get L thrown in for free. This is not
true of the vast majority of fine-tuning cases. There is no known physical scale waiting in the
life-permitting range of the quark masses, fundamental force strengths or the dimensionality
of spacetime. There can be no inflation-like dynamical solution to these fine-tuning problems
because dynamical processes are blind to the requirements of intelligent life.
What if, unbeknownst to us, there was such a fundamental parameter? It would need
to fall into the life-permitting range. As such, we would be solving a fine-tuning problem
by creating at least one more. And we would also need to posit a physical process able to
dynamically drive the value of the quantity in our universe toward p.
4.5 The Amplitude of Primordial Fluctuations Q
Q, the amplitude of primordial fluctuations, is one of Martin Rees’ Just Six Numbers. In our
universe, its value is Q ≈ 2 × 10−5, meaning that in the early universe the density at any
point was typically within 1 part in 100,000 of the mean density. What if Q were different?
“If Q were smaller than 10−6, gas would never condense into gravitationally bound
structures at all, and such a universe would remain forever dark and featureless,
even if its initial ‘mix’ of atoms, dark energy and radiation were the same as our
own. On the other hand, a universe where Q were substantially larger than 10−5
— were the initial “ripples” were replaced by large-amplitude waves — would be
a turbulent and violent place. Regions far bigger than galaxies would condense
early in its history. They wouldn’t fragment into stars but would instead collapse
into vast black holes, each much heavier than an entire cluster of galaxies in our
universe . . . Stars would be packed too close together and buffeted too frequently
to retain stable planetary systems.” (Rees, 1999, pg. 115)
Stenger has two replies. Firstly:
“[T]he inflationary model predicted that the deviation from smoothness should
be one part in 100,000. This prediction was spectacularly verified by the Cosmic
Background Explorer (COBE) in 1992 [Foft 106] . . . While heroic attempts by
the best minds in cosmology have not yet succeeded in calculating the magnitude
of Q, inflation theory successfully predicted the angular correlation across the sky
that has been observed.” [Foft 206]
Note that the first part of the quote contradicts the second part. We are first told that
inflation predicts Q = 10−5, and then we are told that inflation cannot predict Q at all.
Both claims are false. A given inflationary model will predict Q, and it will only predict a
life-permitting value for Q if the parameters of the inflaton potential are suitably fine-tuned.
As Turok (2002) notes, “to obtain density perturbations of the level required by observations
. . . we need to adjust the coupling µ [for a power law potential µφn] to be very small, ∼ 10−13
in Planck units. This is the famous fine-tuning problem of inflation”; see also Barrow &
Tipler (1986, pg. 437) and Brandenberger (2011). Rees’ life-permitting range for Q implies
a fine-tuning of the inflaton potential of ∼ 10−11 with respect to the Planck scale. Tegmark
(2005, particularly Figure 11) argues that on very general grounds we can conclude that life-
permitting inflation potentials are highly unnatural. Susskind (2005, pg. 184) summarises
the situation as follows:
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“A lumpiness [Q] of about 10−5 is essential for life to get a start. But is it easy to
arrange this amount of density contrast? The answer is most decidedly no! The
various parameters governing the inflating universe must be chosen with great
care in order to get the desired result.”
Stenger’s second reply is to ask
“. . . is an order of magnitude fine-tuning? Furthermore, Rees, as he admits, is
assuming all other parameters are unchanged. In the first case where Q is too
small to cause gravitational clumping, increasing the strength of gravity would in-
crease the clumping. Now, as we have seen, the dimensionless strength of gravity
αG is arbitrarily defined. However, gravity is stronger when the masses involved
are greater. So the parameter that would vary along with Q would be the nu-
cleon mass. As for larger Q, it seems unlikely that inflation would ever result in
large fluctuations, given the extensive smoothing that goes on during exponential
expansion.” [Foft 207]
There are a few problems here. We have a clear case of the flippant funambulist fallacy —
the possibility of altering other constants to compensate the change in Q is not evidence
against fine-tuning. Choose Q and, say, αG at random and you are unlikely to have picked
a life-permitting pair, even if our universe is not the only life-permitting one. We also have
a nice example of the cheap-binoculars fallacy. The allowed change in Q relative to its value
in our universe (“an order of magnitude”) is necessarily an underestimate of the degree of
fine-tuning. The question is whether this range is small compared to the possible range of
Q. Stenger seems to see this problem, and so argues that large values of Q are unlikely
to result from inflation. This claim is false, and symptomatic of Stenger’s tenuous grasp of
cosmology26. The upper blue region of Figure 4 shows the distribution of Q for the model of
Tegmark (2005), using the “physically natural expectation” mv = mh. The mean value of Q
ranges from 10 to almost 10000.
Note that Rees only varies Q in “Just Six Numbers” because it is a popular level book.
He and many others have extensively investigated the effect on structure formation of altering
a number of cosmological parameters, including Q.
• Tegmark & Rees (1998) were the first to calculate the range of Q which permits life,
deriving the following limits for the case where ρΛ = 0:
α−1 ln(α−2)−16/9 αG (β/ξ)4/3Ω
−2/3





where these quantities are defined in Table 1, except for the cosmic baryon density
parameter Ωb, and we have omitted geometric factors of order unity. This inequality
demonstrates the variety of physical phenomena, atomic, gravitational and cosmological,
that must combine in the right way in order to produce a life-permitting universe.
Tegmark & Rees also note that there is some freedom to change Q and ρΛ together.
• Tegmark et al. (2006) expanded on this work, looking more closely at the role of the
cosmological constant. We have already seen some of the results from this paper in Sec-
tion 4.2.1. The paper considers 8 anthropic constraints on the 7 dimensional parameter
space (α, β,mp, ρΛ, Q, ξ, ξbaryon). Figure 2 (bottom row) shows that the life-permitting
26More examples are compiled in Appendix A.
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region is boxed-in on all sides. In particular, the freedom to increase Q and ρΛ together
is limited by the life-permitting range of galaxy densities.
• Bousso et al. (2009) considers the 4-dimensional parameter space (β,Q, Teq, ρΛ), where
Teq is the temperature if the CMB at matter-radiation equality. The calculate the
position of what they call “catastrophic boundaries” in this space, across which the
probability of a universe being life-permitting drops dramatically. These boundaries
arise from the ability of galaxies to cool and form stars, and the disruption of halo
formation by the cosmological constant. They are primarily interested in using anthropic
limits to make predictions from the multiverse. Bousso & Leichenauer (2009) and
Bousso & Leichenauer (2010) refine these arguments using a “semianalytic” model for
star-formation as a function of cosmic time. They take particular care to consider the
effects of altering the various parameters simultaneously. While there is some freedom to
increase both Q and ρΛ while holding Q
3/ρΛ constant, for Q & 10−3 vacuum domination
occurs before recombination and stars will not form. (See also the earlier paper by
Garriga et al., 1999).
• Garriga & Vilenkin (2006) discuss what they call the “Q catastrophe”: the probability
distribution for Q across a multiverse typically increases or decreases sharply through
the anthropic window. Thus, we expect that the observed value of Q is very likely to be
close to one of the boundaries of the life-permitting range. The fact that we appear to be
in the middle of the range leads Garriga & Vilenkin to speculate that the life-permitting
range may be narrower than Tegmark & Rees (1998) calculated. For example, there
may be a tighter upper bound due to the perturbation of comets by nearby stars and/or
the problem of nearby supernovae explosions.
• The interested reader is referred to the 90 scientific papers which cite Tegmark & Rees
(1998), catalogued on the NASA Astrophysics Data System27.
The fine-tuning of Q stands up well under examination.
4.6 Cosmological Constant Λ
The cosmological constant problem is described in the textbook of Burgess & Moore (2006)
as “arguably the most severe theoretical problem in high-energy physics today, as measured
by both the difference between observations and theoretical predictions, and by the lack of
convincing theoretical ideas which address it”. A well-understood and well-tested theory of
fundamental physics (Quantum Field Theory — QFT) predicts contributions to the vacuum
energy of the universe that are ∼ 10120 times greater than the observed total value. Stenger’s
reply is guided by the following principle:
“Any calculation that disagrees with the data by 50 or 120 orders of magnitude is
simply wrong and should not be taken seriously. We just have to await the correct
calculation.” [Foft 219]
This seems indistinguishable from reasoning that the calculation must be wrong since other-
wise the cosmological constant would have to be fine-tuned. One could not hope for a more
perfect example of begging the question. More importantly, there is a misunderstanding in
Stenger’s account of the cosmological constant problem. The problem is not that physicists
27http://TegRees.notlong.com
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have made an incorrect prediction. We can use the term dark energy for any form of energy
that causes the expansion of the universe to accelerate, including a “bare” cosmological con-
stant (see Barnes et al., 2005, for an introduction to dark energy). Cosmological observations
constrain the total dark energy. QFT allows us to calculate a number of contributions to
the total dark energy from matter fields in the universe. Each of these contributions turns
out to be 10120 times larger than the total. There is no direct theory-vs.-observation con-
tradiction as one is calculating and measuring different things. The fine-tuning problem is
that these different independent contributions, including perhaps some that we don’t know
about, manage to cancel each other to such an alarming, life-permitting degree. This is not
a straightforward case of Popperian falsification.
Stenger outlines a number of attempts to explain the fine-tuning of the cosmological
constant.
Supersymmetry: Supersymmetry, if it holds in our universe, would cancel out some of the
contributions to the vacuum energy, reducing the required fine-tuning to one part in ∼ 1050.
Stenger admits the obvious — this isn’t an entirely satisfying solution — but there is a deeper
reason to be sceptical of the idea that advances in particle physics could solve the cosmological
constant problem. As Bousso (2008) explains:
“. . . nongravitational physics depends only on energy differences, so the standard
model cannot respond to the actual value of the cosmological constant it sources.
This implies that ρΛ = 0 [i.e. zero cosmological constant] is not a special value
from the particle physics point of view.”
A particle physics solution to the cosmological constant problem would be just as significant
a coincidence as the cosmological constant problem itself. Further, this is not a problem that
appears only at the Planck scale. It is thus unlikely that quantum gravity will solve the
problem. For example, Donoghue (in Carr, 2007) says
“It is unlikely that there is technically natural resolution to the cosmological
constant’s fine-tuning problem — this would require new physics at 10−3 eV.
[Such attempts are] highly contrived to have new dynamics at this extremely low
scale which modifies only gravity and not the other interactions.”
Zero Cosmological Constant: Stenger presents two ideas proporting to show that the
cosmological constant may turn out to be zero. The first is the idea of “Ghost Particles”.
I am not familiar enough with these ideas to provide a critique. The paper that Stenger
cites (Klauber, 2003) has been cited once since first being posted in 2003, and that is from
the author himself. Stenger mentions that Andrei Linde considered similar ideas in 1984.
Linde has long since abandoned these ideas, stating that the “anthropic solution” is “the only
known solution to the cosmological constant problem” (Linde & Vanchurin, 2010)28. This
“anthropic solution” is the multiverse, combined with the principle of mediocrity, which we
will discuss shortly.
The second argument claims to show that the cosmological constant of general relativity
should be defined to be zero. He says:
28This article considers the possibility of a non-anthropic solution which relies only on very special properties
of the multiverse measure. They do not draw any firm conclusions; they only claim to be investigating a
possibility.
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“Only in general relativity, where gravity depends on mass/energy, does an ab-
solute value of mass/energy have any consequence. So general relativity (or a
quantum theory of gravity) is the only place where we can set an absolute zero of
mass/ energy. It makes sense to define zero energy as the situation in which the
source of gravity, the energy momentum tensor, and the cosmological constant are
each zero.”
The second sentence contradicts the first. If gravity depends on the absolute value of
mass/energy, then we cannot set the zero-level to our convenience. It is in particle physics,
where gravity is ignorable, where we are free to define “zero” energy as we like. In gen-
eral relativity there is no freedom to redefine Λ. The cosmological constant has observable
consequences that no amount of redefinition can disguise.
Stenger’s argument fails because of this premise: if (Tµν = 0 ⇒ Gµν = 0) then Λ = 0.
This is true as a conditional, but Stenger has given no reason to believe the antecedent.
Even if we associate the cosmological constant with the “SOURCE” side of the equations,
the antecedent nothing more than an assertion that the vacuum (Tµν = 0) doesn’t gravitate.
Finally, even if Stenger’s argument were successful, it still wouldn’t solve the problem.
The cosmological constant problem is actually a misnomer. This section has discussed the
“bare” cosmological constant. It comes purely from general relativity, and is not associated
with any particular form of energy. The 120 orders-of-magnitude problem refers to vacuum
energy associated with the matter fields of the universe. These are contributions to Tµν .
The source of the confusion is the fact that vacuum energy has the same dynamical effect as
the cosmological constant, so that observations measure an “effective” cosmological constant:
Λeff = Λbare + Λvacuum. The cosmological constant problem is really the vacuum energy
problem. Even if Stenger could show that Λbare = 0, this would do nothing to address why
Λeff is observed to be so much smaller than the predicted contributions to Λvacuum.
Quintessence: Stenger recognises that, even if he could explain why the cosmological con-
stant and vacuum energy are zero, he still needs to explain why the expansion of the universe
is accelerating. One could appeal to an as-yet-unknown form of energy called quintessence,
which has an equation of state w = p/ρ that causes the expansion of the universe to acceler-
ate29 (w < −1/3). Stenger concludes that:
“. . . a cosmological constant is not needed for early universe inflation nor for the
current cosmic acceleration. Note this is not vacuum energy, which is assumed to
be identically zero, so we have no cosmological constant problem and no need for
fine-tuning.”
In reply, it is logically possible that the cause of the universe’s acceleration is not vacuum
energy but some other form of energy. However, to borrow the memorable phrasing of Bousso
(2008), if it looks, walks, swims, flies and quacks like a duck, then the most reasonable conclu-
sion is not that it is a unicorn in a duck outfit. Whatever is causing the accelerated expansion
of the universe quacks like vacuum energy. Quintessence is a unicorn in a duck outfit. We
29Stenger’s Equation 12.22 is incorrect, or at least misleading. By the third Friedmann equation, ρ˙/ρ =
−3H(1+w), one cannot stipulate that the density ρ is constant unless one sets w = −1. Equation 12.22 is thus
only valid for w = −1, in which case it reduces to Equation 12.21 and is indistinguishable from a cosmological
constant. One can solve the Friedmann equations for w 6= −1, for example, if the universe contains only
quintessence, is spatially flat and w is constant, then a(t) = (t/t0)
2/3(1+w), where t0 is the age of the universe.
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are discounting a form of energy with a plausible, independent theoretical underpinning in
favour of one that is pure speculation.
The present energy density of quintessence must fall in the same life-permitting range
that was required of the cosmological constant. We know the possible range of ρΛ because we
have a physical theory of vacuum energy. What is the possible range of ρQ? We don’t know,
because we have no well-tested, well-understood theory of quintessence. This is hypothetical
physics. In the absence of a physical theory of quintessence, and with the hint (as discussed
above) that gravitational physics must be involved, the natural guess for the dark energy
scale is the Planck scale. In that case, ρQ is once again 120 orders of magnitude larger than
the life-permitting scale, and we have simply exchanged the fine-tuning of the cosmological
constant for the fine-tuning of dark energy.
Stenger’s assertion that there is no fine-tuning problem for quintessence is false, as a
number of authors have pointed out. For example, Peacock (2007) notes that most models
of quintessence in the literature specify its properties via a potential V (φ), and comments
that “Quintessence . . . models do not solve the [cosmological constant] problem: the potentials
asymptote to zero, even though there is no known symmetry that requires this”. Quintessence
models must be fine-tuned in exactly the same way as the cosmological constant (see also
Durrer & Maartens, 2007).
Underestimating Λ: Stenger’s presentation of the cosmological constant problem fails to
mention some of the reasons why this problem is so stubborn30. The first is that we know
that the electron vacuum energy does gravitate in some situations. The vacuum polarisation
contribution to the Lamb shift is known to give a nonzero contribution to the energy of
the atom, and thus by the equivalence principle must couple to gravity. Similar effects are
observed for nuclei. The puzzle is not just to understand why the zero point energy does not
gravitate, but why it gravitates in some environments but not in vacuum. Stenger’s assertion
that the calculation of vacuum energy is wrong and can be ignored is na¨ıve. There are certain
contexts where we know that the calculation is correct.
Secondly, a dynamical selection mechanism for the cosmological constant is made difficult
by the fact that only gravity can measure ρΛ, and ρΛ only becomes dynamically important
quite recently in the history of the universe. Polchinski (2006) notes that many of the mech-
anisms aimed at selecting a small value for ρΛ — the Hawking-Hartle wavefunction, the de
Sitter entropy and the Coleman-de Luccia amplitude for tunneling — can only explain why
the cosmological constant vanishes in an empty universe.
Inflation creates another problem for would-be cosmological constant problem solvers. If
the universe underwent a period of inflation in its earliest stages, then the laws of nature are
more than capable of producing life-prohibiting accelerated expansion. The solution must
therefore be rather selective, allowing acceleration in the early universe but severely limiting
it later on. Further, the inflaton field is yet another contributor to the vacuum energy of the
universe, and one with universe-accelerating pedigree. We can write a typical local minimum
of the inflaton potential as: V (φ) = µ(φ− φ0)2 + V0. Post inflation, our universe settles into
the minimum at φ = φ0, and the V0 term contributes to the effective cosmological constant.
We have seen this point previously: the five- and six-pointed stars in Figure 4 show universes
in which the value of V0 is respectively too negative and too positive for the post-inflationary
universe to support life. If the calculation is wrong, then inflation is not a well-characterised
30Some of this section follows the excellent discussion by Polchinski (2006).
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theory. If the field does not cause the expansion of the universe to accelerate, then it cannot
power inflation. There is no known symmetry that would set V0 = 0, because we do not know
what the inflaton is. Most proposed inflation mechanisms operate near the Planck scale, so
this defines the possible range of V0. The 120 order-of-magnitude fine-tuning remains.
The Principle of Mediocrity: Stenger discusses the multiverse solution to the cosmologi-
cal constant problem, which relies on the principle of mediocrity. We will give a more detailed
appraisal of this approach in Section 5. Here we note what Stenger doesn’t: an appeal to the
multiverse is motivated by and dependent on the fine-tuning of the cosmological constant.
Those who defend the multiverse solution to the cosmological constant problem are quite clear
that they do so because they have judged other solutions to have failed. Examples abound:
• “There is not a single natural solution to the cosmological constant problem. ... [With
the discovery that Λ > 0] The cosmological constant problem became suddenly harder,
as one could no longer hope for a deep symmetry setting it to zero.” (Arkani-Hamed
et al., 2005)
• “Throughout the years many people . . . have tried to explain why the cosmological
constant is small or zero. The overwhelming consensus is that these attempts have not
been successful.” (Susskind, 2005, pg. 357)
• “No concrete, viable theory predicting ρΛ = 0 was known by 1998 [when the acceleration
of the universe was discovered] and none has been found since.” (Bousso, 2008)
• “There is no known symmetry to explains why the cosmological constant is either zero
or of order the observed dark energy.” (Hall & Nomura, 2008)
• “As of now, the only viable resolution of [the cosmological constant problem] is provided
by the anthropic approach.” (Vilenkin, 2010)
See also Peacock (2007) and Linde & Vanchurin (2010), quoted above, and Susskind (2003).
Conclusion: There are a number of excellent reviews of the cosmological constant in the
scientific literature (Weinberg, 1989; Carroll, 2001; Vilenkin, 2003; Polchinski, 2006; Durrer
& Maartens, 2007; Padmanabhan, 2007; Bousso, 2008; Martin, 2012). In none will you find
Stenger’s particular brand of dismissiveness. The calculations are known to be correct in
other contexts and so are taken very seriously. Supersymmetry won’t help. The problem
cannot be defined away. The most plausible small-vacuum-selecting mechanisms don’t work
in a universe that contains matter. Particle physics is blind to the absolute value of the
vacuum energy. The cosmological constant problem is not a problem only at the Planck scale
and thus quantum gravity is unlikely to provide a solution. Quintessence and the inflaton
field are just more fields whose vacuum state must be sternly commanded not to gravitate,
or else mutually balanced to an alarming degree.
There is, of course, a solution to the cosmological problem. There is some reason — some
physical reason — why the large contributions to the vacuum energy of the universe don’t
make it life-prohibiting. We don’t currently know what that reason is, but scientific papers
continue to be published that propose new solutions to the cosmological constant problem
(e.g. Shaw & Barrow, 2011). The point is this: however many ways there are of producing
a life-permitting universe, there are vastly many more ways of making a life-prohibiting one.
By the time we discover how our universe solves the cosmological constant problem, we will
have compiled a rather long list of ways to blow a universe to smithereens, or quickly crush it
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into oblivion. Amidst the possible universes, life-permitting ones are exceedingly rare. This
is fine-tuning par excellence.
4.7 Stars
Stars have two essential roles to play in the origin and evolution of intelligent life. They
synthesise the elements needed by life — big bang nucleosynthesis provides only hydrogen,
helium and lithium, which together can form just two chemical compounds (H2 and LiH).
By comparison, Gingerich (Barrow et al., 2008, pg. 23) notes that the carbon and hydrogen
alone can be combined into around 2300 different chemical compounds. Stars also provide a
long-lived, low-entropy source of energy for planetary life, as well as the gravity that holds
planets in stable orbits. The low-entropy of the energy supplied by stars is crucial if life is to
“evade the decay to equilibrium” (Schro¨dinger, 1992).
4.7.1 Stellar Stability
Stars are defined by the forces that hold them in balance. The crushing force of gravity is held
at bay by thermal and radiation pressure. The pressure is sourced by thermal reactions at
the centre of the star, which balance the energy lost to radiation. Stars thus require a balance
between two very different forces — gravity and the strong force — with the electromagnetic
force (in the form of electron scattering opacity) providing the link between the two.
There is a window of opportunity for stars — too small and they won’t be able to ignite
and sustain nuclear fusion at their cores, being supported against gravity by degeneracy rather
than thermal pressure; too large and radiation pressure will dominate over thermal pressure,
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where the first expression uses the more exact calculation of the right-hand-side by Adams
(2008), and the second expression uses Barrow & Tipler’s approximation for the minimum
nuclear ignition temperature Tnuc ∼ ηα2mp, where η ≈ 0.025 for hydrogen burning. Outside
this range, stars are not stable: anything big enough to burn is big enough to blow itself
apart. Adams (2008) showed there is another criterion that must be fulfilled for stars have a
stable burning configuration,
~G
meα2C . 3.1× 10
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where C is a composite parameter related to nuclear reaction rates, and we have specialised
Equation 44 of Adams to the case where stellar opacity is due to Thomson scattering.
Adams combines these constraints in (G,α, C) parameter space, holding all other param-
eters constant, as shown in Figure 5. Below the solid line, stable stars are possible. The
dashed (dotted) line shows the corresponding constraint for universes in which C is increased
(decreased) by a factor of 100. Adams remarks that “within the parameter space shown,
which spans 10 orders of magnitude in both α and G, about one-fourth of the space supports
the existence of stars”.
Stenger [Foft 243] cites Adams’ result, but crucially omits the modifier shown. Adams
makes no attempt to justify the limits of parameter space as he has shown them. Further,
there is no justification of the use of logarithmic axes, which significantly affects the estimate
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Figure 5: The parameter space (G,α),
shown relative to their values in our uni-
verse (G0, α0). The triangle shows our
universe. Below the solid line, stable
stars are possible. The dashed (dotted)
line shows the corresponding constraint
for universes in which C is increased (de-
creased) by a factor of 100. Note that
the axes are logarithmic and span 10 or-
ders of magnitude. Figure from Adams
(2008).
of the probability31. The figure of “one-fourth” is almost meaningless — given any life-
permitting region, one can make it equal one-fourth of parameter space by chopping and
changing said space. This is a perfect example of the cheap-binoculars fallacy. If one allows
G to increase until gravity is as strong as the strong force (αG ≈ αs ≈ 1), and uses linear
rather than logarithmic axes, the stable-star-permitting region occupies ∼ 10−38 of parameter
space. Even with logarithmic axes, fine-tuning cannot be avoided — zero is a possible value
of G, and thus is part of parameter space. However, such a universe is not life-permitting,
and so there is a minimum life-permitting value of G. A logarithmic axis, by placing G = 0
at negative infinity, puts an infinitely large region of parameter space outside of the life-
permitting region. Stable stars would then require infinite fine-tuning. Note further that the
fact that our universe (the triangle in Figure 5) isn’t particularly close to the life-permitting
boundary is irrelevant to fine-tuning as we have defined it. We conclude that the existence of
stable stars is indeed a fine-tuned property of our universe.
4.7.2 The Hoyle Resonance
One of the most famous examples of fine-tuning is the Hoyle resonance in carbon. Hoyle
reasoned that if such a resonance level did not exist at just the right place, then stars would
be unable to produce the carbon required by life32.
Is the Hoyle resonance (called the 0+ level) fine-tuned? Stenger quotes the work of Livio
et al. (1989), who considered the effect on the carbon and oxygen production of stars when
the 0+ level is shifted. They found one could increase the energy of the level by 60 keV
without effecting the level of carbon production. Is this a large change or a small one? Livio
et al. (1989) ask just this question, noting the following. The permitted shift represents a
31More precisely, to use the area element in Figure 5 as the probability measure, one is assuming a probability
distribution that is linear in log10G and log10 α. There is, of course, no problem in using logarithmic axes to
illustrate the life-permitting region.
32Hoyle’s prediction is not an “anthropic prediction”. As Smolin (2007) explains, the prediction can be
formulated as follows: a.) Carbon is necessary for life. b.) There are substantial amounts of carbon in our
universe. c.) If stars are to produce substantial amounts of carbon, then there must be a specific resonance
level in carbon. d.) Thus, the specific resonance level in carbon exists. The conclusion does not depend in any
way on the first, “anthropic” premise. The argument would work just as well if the element in question were
the inert gas neon, for which the first premise is (probably) false.
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0.7% change in the energy of the level itself. It is 3% of the energy difference between the 0+
level and the next level up in the carbon nucleus (3−). It is 16 % of the difference between
the energy of the 0+ state and the energy of three alpha particles, which come together to
form carbon.
Stenger argues that this final estimate is the most appropriate one, quoting from Weinberg
(Carr, 2007):
“We know that even-even nuclei have states that are well described as composites
of α-particles. One such state is the ground state of Be8, which is unstable against
fission into two α-particles.The same α-α potential that produces that sort of
unstable state in Be8 could naturally be expected to produce an unstable state in
C12 that is essentially a composite of three α-particles, and that therefore appears
as a low-energy resonance in α-Be8 reactions. So the existence of this state does
not seem to me to provide any evidence of fine tuning.”
As Cohen (2008) notes, the 0+ state is known as a breathing mode; all nuclei have such a
state.
However, we are not quite done with assessing this fine-tuning case. The existence of the
0+ level is not enough. It must have the right energy, and so we need to ask how the properties
of the resonance level, and thus stellar nucleosynthesis, change as we alter the fundamental
constants. Oberhummer et al. (2000a)33 have performed such calculations, combining the
predictions of a microscopic 12-body, three-alpha cluster model of 12C (as alluded to by
Weinberg) with a stellar nucleosynthesis code. They conclude that:
“Even with a change of 0.4% in the strength of [nucleon-nucleon] force, carbon-
based life appears to be impossible, since all the stars then would produce either
almost solely carbon or oxygen, but could not produce both elements.”
Schlattl et al. (2004), by the same group, noted an important caveat on their previous result.
Modelling the later, post-hydrogen-burning stages of stellar evolution is difficult even for
modern codes, and the inclusion of He-shell flashes seems to lessen the degree of fine-tuning
of the Hoyle resonance.
Ekstro¨m et al. (2010) considered changes to the Hoyle resonance in the context of Pop-
ulation III stars. These first-generation stars play an important role in the production of
the elements needed by life. Ekstro¨m et al. (2010) place similar limits to Oberhummer et al.
(2000a) on the nucleon-nucleon force, and go further by translating these limits into limits on
the fine-structure constant, α. A fractional change in α of one part in 105 would change the
energy of the Hoyle resonance enough that stars would contain carbon or oxygen at the end
of helium burning but not both.
There is again reason to be cautious, as stellar evolution has not been followed to the very
end of the life of the star. Nevertheless, these calculations are highly suggestive — the main
process by which carbon and oxygen are synthesised in our universe is drastically curtailed by
a tiny change in the fundamental constants. Life would need to hope that sufficient carbon
and oxygen are synthesized in other ways, such as supernovae. We conclude that Stenger has
failed to turn back the force of this fine-tuning case. The ability of stars in our universe to
produce both carbon and oxygen seems to be a rare talent.
33See also Oberhummer et al. (1998, 2000b); Cso´to´ et al. (2001); Oberhummer (2001).
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Figure 6: The life-permitting region (shown in white) in the (α, β) (left) and (α, αs) (right)
parameter space, with other constants held at their values in our universe. Our universe is
shown as a blue cross. These figures are similar to those of Tegmark (1998). The numbered
regions and solid lines are explained in Section 4.8. The blue dot-dashed line is discussed in
Section 4.8.2.
4.8 Forces and Masses
In Chapters 7-10, Stenger turns his attention to the strength of the fundamental forces and
the masses of the elementary particles. These quantities are among the most discussed in
the fine-tuning literature, beginning with Carter (1974), Carr & Rees (1979) and Barrow &
Tipler (1986). Figure 6 shows in white the life-permitting region of (α, β) (left) and (α, αs)
(right) parameter space34. The axes are scaled like arctan(log10[x]), so that the interval [0,∞]
maps onto a finite range. The blue cross shows our universe. This figure is similar to those
of Tegmark (1998). The various regions illustrated are as follows:
1. For hydrogen to exist — to power stars and form water and organic compounds — we
must have me < mn −mp. Otherwise, the electron will be captured by the proton to
form a neutron (Hogan, 2006; Damour & Donoghue, 2008).
2. For stable atoms, we need the radius of the electron orbit to be significantly larger than
the nuclear radius, which requires αβ/αs  1 (Barrow & Tipler, 1986, pg. 320). The
region shown is αβ/αs < 1/1000, which Stenger adopts [Foft 244].
3. We require that the typical energy of chemical reactions is much smaller than the typical
energy of nuclear reactions. This ensures that the atomic constituents of chemical
species maintain their identity in chemical reactions. This requires α2β/α2s  1 (Barrow
& Tipler, 1986, pg. 320). The region shown is α2β/α2s < 1/1000.
4. Unless β1/4  1, stable ordered molecular structures (like chromosomes) are not stable.
The atoms will too easily stray from their place in the lattice and the substance will
spontaneously melt (Barrow & Tipler, 1986, pg. 305). The region shown is β1/4 < 1/3.
5. The stability of the proton requires α . (md−mu)/141 MeV, so that the extra electro-
magnetic mass-energy of a proton relative to a neutron is more than counter-balanced
by the bare quark masses (Hogan, 2000; Hall & Nomura, 2008).
34In the left plot, we hold mp constant, so we vary β = me/mp by varying the electron mass.
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6. Unless α 1, the electrons in atoms and molecules are unstable to pair creation (Barrow
& Tipler, 1986, pg. 297). The limit shown is α < 0.2. A similar constraint is calculated
by Lieb & Yau (1988).
7. As in Equation 10, stars will not be stable unless β & α2/100.
8. Unless αs/αs,0 . 1.003 + 0.031α/α0 (Davies, 1972), the diproton has a bound state,
which affects stellar burning and big bang nucleosynthesis. (Note, however, the caveats
mentioned in Footnote 15.)
9. Unless αs . 0.3α1/2, carbon and all larger elements are unstable (Barrow & Tipler,
1986, pg. 326).
10. Unless αs/αs,0 & 0.91 (Davies, 1972), the deuteron is unstable and the main nuclear
reaction in stars (pp) does not proceed. A similar effect would be achieved35 unless
md − mu + me < 3.4 MeV which makes the pp reaction energetically unfavourable
(Hogan, 2000). This region is numerically very similar to Region 1 in the left plot; the
different scaling with the quark masses is illustrated in Figure 8.
• The grey stripe on the left of each plot shows where α < αG, rendering electric forces
weaker than gravitational ones.
• To the left of our universe (the blue cross) is shown the limit of Adams (2008) on stellar
stability, Equation 11. The limit shown is α > 7.3× 10−5, as read off figure 5 of Adams
(2008). The dependence on β and αs has not been calculated, and so only the limit for
the case when these parameters take the value they have in our universe is shown36.
• The upper limit shown in the right plot of Figure 6 is the result of MacDonald &
Mullan (2009) that the amount of hydrogen left over from big bang nucleosynthesis is
significantly diminished when αs > 0.27. Note that this is weaker than the condition
that the diproton be bound. The dependence on α has not been calculated, so only a
1D limit is shown.
• The dashed line in the left plot shows a striking coincidence discussed by Carter (1974),
namely α12β4 ∼ αG. Near this line, the universe will contain both radiative and con-
vective stars. Carter conjectured that life may require both types for reasons pertaining
to planet formation and supernovae. This reason is somewhat dubious, but a better
case can be made. The same coincidence can be shown to ensure that the surface tem-
perature of stars is close to “biological temperature” (Barrow & Tipler, 1986, pg. 338).
In other words, it ensures that the photons emitted by stars have the right energy to
break chemical bonds. This permits photosynthesis, allowing electromagnetic energy to
be converted into and stored as chemical energy in plants. However, it is not clear how
close to the line a universe must be to be life-permitting, and the calculation considers
only radiation dominated stars.
35As with the stability of the diproton, there is a caveat. Weinberg (in Carr, 2007) notes that if the pp
reaction p+ + p+ →2 H + e+νe is rendered energetically unfavourable by changing the fundamental masses,
then the reaction p+ + e−+ p+ →2 H + νe will still be favourable so long as md−mu−me < 3.4 MeV. This is
a weaker condition. Note, however, that the pep reaction is 400 times less likely to occur in our universe than
pp, meaning that pep stars must burn hotter. Such stars have not been simulated in the literature. Note also
that the full effect of an unstable deuteron on stars and their formation has not been calculated. Primordial
helium burning may create enough carbon, nitrogen and oxygen to allow the CNO cycle to burn hydrogen in
later generation stars.
36Even this limit should be noted with caution, as it holds for constant C. As C appears to depend on α,
the corresponding limit on α may be a different plane to the one shown in Figure 6.
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• The left solid line shows the lower limit α > 1/180 for a grand-unified theory to unify no
higher than the Planck scale. The right solid line shows the boundary of the condition
that protons be stable on stellar timescales (β2 > α (αG expα
−1)−1, Barrow & Tipler,
1986, pg. 358). These limits are based on Grand Unified Theories (GUT) and thus
somewhat more speculative. We will say more about GUTs below.
• The triple-alpha constraint is not shown. The constraint on carbon production from
Ekstro¨m et al. (2010) is −3.5 × 10−5 . ∆α/α . +1.8 × 10−5, as discussed in Section
4.7.2. Note also the caveats discussed there. This only considers the change in α i.e.
horizontally, and the life-permitting region is likely to be a 2D strip in both the (α, β)
and (α, αs) plane. As this strip passes our universe, its width in the x-direction is
one-thousandth of the width of one of the vertical black lines.
• The limits placed on α and β from chemistry are weaker than the constraints listed
above. If we consider the nucleus to be fixed in space, then the time-independent,
non-relativistic Schro¨dinger equation scales with α2me i.e. the relative energy and
properties of the energy levels of electrons (which determine chemical bonding) are
unchanged (Barrow & Tipler, 1986, pg. 533). The change in chemistry with fundamental
parameters depends on the accuracy of the approximations of an infinite mass nucleus
and non-relativistic electrons. This has been investigated by King et al. (2010) who
considered the bond angle and length in water, and the reaction energy of a number of
organic reactions. While “drastic changes in the properties of water” occur for α & 0.08
and β & 0.054, it is difficult to predict what impact these changes would have on the
origin and evolution of life.
Note that there are four more constraints on α, me and mp from the cosmological considera-
tions of Tegmark et al. (2006), as discussed in Section 4.2. There are more cases of fine-tuning
to be considered when we expand our view to consider all the parameters of the standard
model of particle physics.
Agrawal et al. (1998a,b) considered the life-permitting range of the Higgs mass parameter
µ2, and the corresponding limits on the vacuum expectation value (v =
√−µ2/λ), which takes
the value 246 GeV = 2 × 10−17mPl in our universe. After exploring the range [−mPl,mPl],
they find that “only for values in a narrow window is life likely to be possible”. In Planck
units, the relevant limits are: for v > 4× 10−17, the deuteron is strongly unstable (see point
10 above); for v > 10−16, the neutron is heavier than the proton by more than the nucleon’s
binding energy, so that even bound neutrons decay into protons and no nuclei larger than
hydrogen are stable; for v > 2 × 10−14, only the ∆++ particle is stable and the only stable
nucleus has the chemistry of helium; for v . 2×10−19, stars will form very slowly (∼ 1017 yr)
and burn out very quickly (∼ 1 yr), and the large number of stable nucleon species may make
nuclear reactions so easy that the universe contains no light nuclei. Damour & Donoghue
(2008) refined the limits of Agrawal et al. by considering nuclear binding, concluding that
unless 0.78× 10−17 < v < 3.3× 10−17 hydrogen is unstable to the reaction p+ e→ n+ ν (if
v is too small) or else there is no nuclear binding at all (if v is too large).
Jeltema & Sher (1999) combined the conclusions of Agrawal et al. and Oberhummer et al.
(2000a) to place a constraint on the Higgs vev from the fine-tuning of the Hoyle resonance
(Section 4.7.2). They conclude that a 1% change in v from its value in our universe would
significantly affect the ability of stars to synthesise both oxygen and carbon. Hogan (2006)
reached a similar conclusion: “In the absence of an identified compensating factor, increases
in [v/ΛQCD] of more than a few percent lead to major changes in the overall cosmic carbon
44
creation and distribution”. Remember, however, the caveats of Section 4.7.2: it is difficult to
predict exactly when a major change becomes a life-prohibiting change.
There has been considerable attention given to the fine-tuning of the masses of fundamen-
tal particles, in particular mu, md and me. We have already seen the calculation of Barr &
Khan (2007) in Figure 2, which shows the life-permitting region of the mu−md plane. Hogan
(2000) was one of the first to consider the fine-tuning of the quark masses (see also Hogan,
2006). Such results have been confirmed and extended by Damour & Donoghue (2008), Hall
& Nomura (2008) and Bousso et al. (2009).
Jaffe et al. (2009) examined a different slice through parameter space, varying the masses of
the quarks while “holding as much as possible of the rest of the Standard Model phenomenology
constant” [emphasis original]. In particular, they fix the electron mass, and vary ΛQCD so that
the average mass of the lightest baryon(s) is 940 MeV, as in our universe. These restrictions
are chosen to make the characterisation of these other universes more certain. Only nuclear
stability is considered, so that a universe is deemed congenial if both carbon and hydrogen
are stable. The resulting congenial range is shown in Figure 7. The height of each triangle is
proportional to the total mass of the three lightest quarks: mT = mu +md +ms; the centre
triangle has mT as in our universe. The perpendicular distance from each side represents
the mass of the u, d and s quarks. The lower green region shows universes like ours with
two light quarks (mu,md  ms), and is bounded above by the stability of some isotope
of hydrogen (in this case, tritium) and below by the corresponding limit for carbon 10C,
(−21.80MeV < mp − mn < 7.97MeV). The smaller green strip shows a novel congenial
region, where there is one light quark (md  ms ≈ mu). This congeniality band has half the
width of the band in which our universe is located. The red regions are uncongenial, while
white regions show where it is uncertain where the red-green boundary should lie. Note two
things about the larger triangle on the right. Firstly, the smaller congenial band detaches
from the edge of the triangle for mT & 1.22mT,0 as the lightest baryon is the ∆++, which
would be incapable of forming nuclei. Secondly, and most importantly for our purposes, the
absolute width of the green regions remains the same, and thus the congenial fraction of the
space decreases approximately as 1/mT. Moving from the centre (mT = mT,0) to the right
(mT = 2mT,0) triangle of Figure 7, the congenial fraction drops from 14% to 7%. Finally,
“congenial” is almost certainly a weaker constraint than “life-permitting”, since only nuclear
stability is investigated. For example, a universe with only tritium will have an element which
is chemically very similar to hydrogen, but stars will not have 1H as fuel and will therefore
burn out significantly faster.
Tegmark et al. (2005) studied anthropic constraints on the total mass of the three neutrino
species. If
∑
mν & 1 eV then galaxy formation is significantly suppressed by free streaming.
If
∑
mν is large enough that neutrinos are effectively another type of cold dark matter, then
the baryon fraction in haloes would be very low, affecting baryonic disk and star formation.
If all neutrinos are heavy, then neutrons would be stable and big bang nucleosynthesis would
leave no hydrogen for stars and organic compounds. This study only varies one parameter,
but its conclusions are found to be “rather robust” when ρΛ is also allowed to vary
37 (Pogosian
& Vilenkin, 2007).
There are a number of tentative anthropic limits relating to baryogenesis. Baryogenesis is
clearly crucial to life — a universe which contained equal numbers of protons and antiprotons
at annihilation would only contain radiation, which cannot form complex structures. However,





Figure 7: The results of Jaffe et al. (2009), showing in green the region of (mu,md,ms)
parameter space that is “congenial”, meaning that at least one isotope of hydrogen and
carbon is stable. The height of each triangle is proportional to mT = mu + md + ms, with
the centre triangle having mT as in our universe. The perpendicular distance from each side
represents the mass of the u, d and s quarks. See the text for details of the instabilities in
the red “uncongenial” regions.
we do not currently have a well-understood and well-tested theory of baryogenesis, so caution
is advised. Gould (2010) has argued that three or more generations of quarks and leptons are
required for CP violation, which is one of the necessary conditions for baryogenesis (Sakharov,
1967; Cahn, 1996; Schellekens, 2008). Hall & Nomura (2008) state that v/ΛQCD ∼ 1 is
required “so that the baryon asymmetry of the early universe is not washed out by sphaleron
effects” (see also Arkani-Hamed et al., 2005).
Harnik et al. (2006) attempted to find a region of parameter space which is life-permitting
in the absence of the weak force. With some ingenuity, they plausibly discovered one, subject
to the following conditions. To prevent big bang nucleosynthesis burning all hydrogen to
helium in the early universe, they must use a “judicious parameter adjustment” and set the
baryon to photon radio ηb = 4 × 10−12. The result is a substantially increased abundance
of deuterium, ∼ 10% by mass. ΛQCD and the masses of the light quarks and leptons are
held constant, which means that the nucleon masses and thus nuclear physics is relatively
unaffected (except, of course, for beta decay) so long as we “insist that the weakless universe
is devoid of heavy quarks” to avoid problems relating to the existence of stable baryons38 Λ+c ,
Λ0b and Λ
+
t . Since v ∼ mPl in the weakless universe, holding the light fermion masses constant
requires the Yukawa parameters (Γe,Γu,Γd,Γs) must all be set by hand to be less than 10
−20
(Feldstein et al., 2006). The weakless universe requires Ωbaryon/Ωdark matter ∼ 10−3, 100
times less than in our universe. This is very close to the limit of Tegmark et al. (2006),
who calculated that unless Ωbaryon/Ωdark matter & 5× 10−3, gas will not cool into galaxies to
form stars. Galaxy formation in the weakless universe will thus be considerably less efficient,
relying on rare statistical fluctuations and cooling via molecular viscosity. The proton-proton
reaction which powers stars in our universe relies on the weak interaction, so stars in the
weakless universe burn via proton-deuterium reactions, using deuterium left over from the
big bang. Stars will burn at a lower temperature, and probably with shorter lifetimes. Stars
38In the absence of weak decay, the weakless universe will conserve each individual quark number.
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will still be able to undergo accretion supernovae (Type 1a), but the absence of core-collapse
supernovae will seriously affect the oxygen available for planet formation and life (Clavelli &
White, 2006). Only ∼ 1% of the oxygen in our universe comes from accretion supernovae. It
is then somewhat optimistic to claim that (Gedalia et al., 2011),
p(observer|{αus}) ≈ p(observer|{αweakless}) , (12)
where {αus} ({αweakless}) represents the set of parameters of our (the weakless) universe.
Note that, even if Equation 12 holds, the weakless universe at best opens up a life-permitting
region of parameter space of similar size to the region in which our universe resides. The need
for a life-permitting universe to be fine-tuned is not significantly affected.
4.8.1 The Origin of Mass
Let’s consider Stenger’s responses to these cases of fine-tuning.
Higgs and Hierarchy:
“[E]lectrons, muons, and tauons all pick up mass by the Higgs mechanism. Quarks
must pick up some of their masses this way, but they obtain most of their masses
by way of the strong interaction . . . All these masses are orders of magnitude
less than the Planck mass, and no fine-tuning was necessary to make gravity
much weaker than electromagnetism. This happened naturally and would have
occurred for a wide range of mass values, which, after all, are just small corrections
to their intrinsically zero masses. . . . In any case, these small mass corrections do
not call for any fine-tuning or indicate that our universe is in any way special.
. . . [mpme/m
2
Pl] is so small because the masses of the electron and the protons
are so small compared to the Planck mass, which is the only “natural” mass
you can form from the simplest combination of fundamental constants.” [Foft
154,156,175]
Stenger is either not aware of the hierarchy and flavour problems, or else he has solved some
of the most pressing problems in particle physics and not bothered to pass this information
on to his colleagues:
Lisa Randall: [T]he universe seems to have two entirely different mass scales, and we don’t
understand why they are so different. There’s what’s called the Planck scale, which is
associated with gravitational interactions. It’s a huge mass scale . . . 1019 GeV. Then
there’s the electroweak scale, which sets the masses for the W and Z bosons. [∼ 100
GeV] . . . So the hierarchy problem, in its simplest manifestation, is how can you have
these particles be so light when the other scale is so big. (Taubes, 2002)
Frank Wilzcek: [W]e have no . . . compelling idea about the origin of the enormous number
[mPl/me] = 2.4× 1022. If you would like to humble someone who talks glibly about the
Theory of Everything, just ask about it, and watch ‘em squirm (Wilczek, 2005).
Leonard Susskind: [T]he up- and down-quarks are absurdly light. The fact that they are
roughly twenty thousand times lighter than particles like the Z-boson . . . needs an ex-
planation. The Standard Model has not provided one. Thus, we can ask what the world
would be like is the up- and down-quarks were much heavier than they are. Once again
— disaster! (Susskind, 2005, pg. 176).
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The problem is as follows. The mass of a fundamental particle in the standard model is set
by two factors: mi = Γiv/
√
2, where i labels the particle species, Γi is called the Yukawa
parameter (e.g. electron: Γe ≈ 2.9 × 10−6, up quark: Γu ≈ 1.4 × 10−5, down quark: Γd ≈
2.8× 10−5), and v is the Higgs vacuum expectation value, which is the same for all particles
(see Burgess & Moore, 2006, for an introduction). Note that, contra Stenger, the bare masses
of the quarks are not related to the strong force39.
There are, then, two independent ways in which the masses of the basic constituents of
matter are surprisingly small: v = 2 × 10−17mPl, which “is so notorious that it’s acquired
a special name — the Hierarchy Problem — and spawned a vast, inconclusive literature”
(Wilczek, 2006a), and Γi ∼ 10−6, which implies that, for example, the electron mass is
unnaturally smaller than its (unnaturally small) natural scale set by the Higgs condensate
(Wilczek, in Carr, 2007, pg. 53). This is known as the flavour problem.
Let’s take a closer look at the hierarchy problem. The problem (as ably explained by
Martin, 1998) is that the Higgs mass (squared) m2H receives quantum corrections from the
virtual effects of every particle that couples, directly or indirectly, to the Higgs field. These
corrections are enormous - their natural scale is the Planck scale, so that these contributions
must be fine-tuned to mutually cancel to one part in m2Pl/m
2
H ≈ 1032. Stenger’s reply is to
say that:
“. . . the masses of elementary particles are small compared to the Planck mass.
No fine-tuning is required. Small masses are a natural consequence of the origin
of mass. The masses of elementary particles are essentially small corrections to
their intrinsically zero masses.” [Foft 187]
Here we see the problem itself presented as its solution. It is precisely the smallness of the
quantum corrections wherein the fine-tuning lies. If the Planck mass is the “natural” [Foft
175] mass scale in physics, then it sets the scale for all mass terms, corrections or otherwise.
Just calling them “small” doesn’t explain anything.
Attempts to solve the hierarchy problem have driven the search for theories beyond the
standard model: technicolor, the supersymmetric standard model, large extra dimensions,
warped compactifications, little Higgs theories and more40. The LHC will hopefully test such
theories, which have fallen in and out of favour; technicolor, for example, is currently out
of favour due to the ad hoc postulation of many new particles in complicated patterns and
conflict with precision electroweak data (Wilczek, 1997; Sekhar Chivukula, 2004). In addition,
a number of authors have investigated an anthropic (i.e. multiverse) solution to the hierarchy
problem (Arkani-Hamed & Dimopoulos, 2005; Arkani-Hamed et al., 2005; Feldstein et al.,
2006; Hall & Nomura, 2008, 2010; Donoghue et al., 2010).
Perhaps the most popular option is supersymmetry, whereby the Higgs mass scale doesn’t
receive corrections from mass scales above the supersymmetry-breaking scale ΛSM due to
equal and opposite contributions from particles and their supersymmetric partner. This ties
39The most charitable reading of Stenger’s claim is that he is referring to the constituent quark model,
wherein the mass-energy of the cloud of virtual quarks and gluons that surround a valence quark in a composite
particle is assigned to the quark itself. In this model, the quarks have masses of ∼ 300 MeV. The constituent
quark model is a non-relativistic phenomenological model which provides a simple approximation to the more
fundamental but more difficult theory (QCD) that is useful at low-energies. It is completely irrelevant to the
cases of fine-tuning in the literature concerning quark masses (e.g. Agrawal et al., 1998a; Hogan, 2000; Barr
& Khan, 2007), all of which discuss the bare (or current) quark masses. In fact, even a charge of irrelevance
is too charitable — Stenger later quotes the quark masses as ∼ 5 MeV, which is the current quark mass.
40See the list of references in Arkani-Hamed et al. (2005).
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v to ΛSM. The question now is: why is ΛSM  mPl? This is known in the literature as
“the µ-problem”, in reference to the parameter in the supersymmetric potential that sets
the relevant mass scale. The value of µ in our universe is probably ∼ 102 − 103 GeV. The
natural scale for µ is mPl, and thus we still do not have an explanation for why the quark
and lepton masses are so small. Low-energy supersymmetry does not by itself explain the
magnitude of the weak scale, though it protects it from radiative correction (Barr & Khan,
2007). Solutions to the µ-problem can be found in the literature (see Martin, 1998, for a
discussion and references). Perhaps the best hope is that a solution similar to the mechanism
that explains the QCD scale (discussed below) will be found (Schellekens, 2008, pg. 65ff.)
We can draw some conclusions. First, Stenger’s discussion of the surprising lightness of
fundamental masses is woefully inadequate. To present it as a solved problem of particle
physics is a gross misrepresentation of the literature. Secondly, smallness is not sufficient for
life. Recall that Damour & Donoghue (2008) showed that unless 0.78 × 10−17 < v/mPl <
3.3 × 10−17, the elements are unstable. The masses must be sufficiently small but not too
small. Finally, suppose that the LHC discovers that supersymmetry is a (broken) symmetry of
our universe. This would not be the discovery that the universe could not have been different.
It would not be the discovery that the masses of the fundamental particles must be small. It
would at most show that our universe has chosen a particularly elegant and beautiful way to
be life-permitting.
QCD and Mass-Without-Mass: The bare quark masses, discussed above, only account
for a small fraction of the mass of the proton and neutron. The majority of the other 95%
comes from the strong force binding energy of the valence quarks. This contribution can
be written as aΛQCD, where a ≈ 4 is a dimensionless constant determined by quantum
chromodynamics (QCD). In Planck units, ΛQCD ≈ 10−20mPl. The question “why is gravity
so feeble?” (i.e. αG  1) is at least partly answered if we can explain why ΛQCD  mPl.
Unlike the bare masses of the quarks and leptons, we can answer this question from within
the standard model.
The strength of the strong force αs is a function of the energy of the interaction. ΛQCD is
the mass-energy scale at which αs diverges. Given that the strength of the strong force runs
very slowly (logarithmically) with energy, there is a exponential relationship between ΛQCD






where b is a constant of order unity. Thus, if the QCD coupling is even moderately small
at the unification scale, the QCD scale will be a long way away. To make this work in our
universe, we need αs(mU) ≈ 1/25, and mU ≈ 1016 GeV (De Boer & Sander, 2004). The
calculation also depends on the spectrum of quark flavours; see Hogan (2000), Wilczek (2002)
and Schellekens (2008, Appendix C).
As an explanation for the value of the proton and neutron mass in our universe, we
aren’t done yet. We don’t know how to calculate the αs(mU), and there is still the puzzle
of why the unification scale is three orders of magnitude below the Planck scale. From a
fine-tuning perspective, however, this seems to be good progress, replacing the major miracle
ΛQCD/mPl ∼ 10−20 with a more minor one, αs(mU) ∼ 10−1. Such explanations have been
discussed in the fine-tuning literature for many years (Carr & Rees, 1979; Hogan, 2000).
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Note that this does not completely explain the smallness of the proton mass, since mp is
the sum of a number of contributions: QCD (ΛQCD), electromagnetism, the masses of the
valence quarks (mu and md), and the mass of the virtual quarks, including the strange quark,
which makes a surprisingly large contribution to the mass of ordinary matter. We need all of
the contributions to be small in order for mp to be small.
Potential problems arise when we need the proton mass to fall within a specific range,
rather than just be small, since the proton mass depends very sensitively (exponentially) on
αU. For example, consider Region 4 in Figure 6, β
1/4  1. The constraint shown, β1/4 < 1/3
would require a 20-fold decrease in the proton mass to be violated, which (using Equation 13)
translates to decreasing αU by ∼ 0.003. Similarly, Region 7 will be entered if αU is increased41
by ∼ 0.008. We will have more to say about grand unification and fine-tuning below. For
the moment, we note that the fine-tuning of the mass of the proton can be translated into
anthropic limits on GUT parameters.
Protons, Neutrons, Electrons: We turn now to the relative masses of the three most
important particles in our universe: the proton, neutron and electron, from which atoms are
made. Consider first the ratio of the electron to the proton mass, β, of which Stenger says:
“. . . we can argue that the electron mass is going to be much smaller than the
proton mass in any universe even remotely like ours. . . . The electron gets its
mass by interacting electroweakly with the Higgs boson. The proton, a composite
particle, gets most of its mass from the kinetic energies of gluons swirling around
inside. They interact with one another by way of the strong interaction, leading to
relatively high kinetic energies. Unsurprisingly, the proton’s mass is much higher
than the electron’s and is likely to be so over a large region of parameter space.
. . . The electron mass is much smaller than the proton mass because it gets its
mass solely from the electroweak Higgs mechanism, so being less than 1.29 MeV
is not surprising and also shows no sign of fine-tuning.” [Foft 164,178]
The fact that Stenger is comparing the electron mass in our universe with the electron mass in
universes “like ours” is all the evidence one needs to conclude that Stenger doesn’t understand
fine-tuning. The fact that universes like ours turn out to be rather similar to our universe
isn’t particularly enlightening.
In terms of the parameters of the standard model, β ≡ me/mp ≈ Γev/aΛQCD. The small-
ness of β is thus quite surprising, since the ratio of the natural mass scale of the electron and
the proton is v/ΛQCD ≈ 103. The smallness of β stems from the fact that the dimensionless
constant for the proton is of order unity (a ≈ 4), while the Yukawa constant for the electron
is unnaturally small Γe ≈ 10−6. Stenger’s assertion that the Higgs mechanism (with mass
scale 246 GeV) accounts for the smallness of the electron mass (0.000511 GeV) is false.
The other surprising aspect of the smallness of β is the remarkable proximity of the
QCD and electroweak scales (Arkani-Hamed & Dimopoulos, 2005); in Planck units, v ≈
2 × 10−17mPl and ΛQCD ≈ 2 × 10−20mPl. Given that β is constrained from both above and
below anthropically (Figure 6), this coincidence is required for life.
41A few caveats. This estimate assumes that this small change in αU will not significantly change α. The
dependence seems to be flatter than linear, so this assumption appears to hold. Also, be careful in applying
the limits on β in Figure 6 to the proton mass, as where appropriate only the electron mass was varied. For
example, Region 1 depends on the proton-neutron mass difference, which doesn’t change with ΛQCD and thus
does not place a constraint on αU.
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Let’s look at the proton-neutron mass difference.
“. . . this apparently fortuitous arrangement of masses has a plausible explanation
within the framework of the standard model. . . . the proton and neutron get most
of their masses from the strong interaction, which makes no distinction between
protons and neutrons. If that were all there was to it, their masses would be
equal. However, the masses and charges of the two are not equal, which implies
that the mass difference is electroweak in origin. . . . Again, if quark masses were
solely a consequence of the strong interaction, these would be equal. Indeed, the
lattice QCD calculations discussed in chapter 7 give the u and d quarks masses of
3.3 ± 0.4 MeV. On the other hand, the masses of the two quarks are estimated
to be in the range 1.5 to 3 MeV for the u quark and 2.5 to 5.5 MeV for the d
quark. This gives a mass difference range md−mu from 1 to 4 Mev. The neutron-
proton mass difference is 1.29 MeV, well within that range. We conclude that the
mass difference between the neutron and proton results from the mass difference
between the d and u quarks, which, in turn, must result from their electroweak
interaction with the Higgs field. No fine-tuning is once again evident.” [Foft
178]
Let’s first deal with the Lattice QCD (LQCD) calculations. LQCD is a method of reformulat-
ing the equations of QCD in a way that allows them to be solved on a supercomputer. LQCD
does not calculate the quark masses from the fundamental parameters of the standard model
— they are fundamental parameters of the standard model. Rather, “[t]he experimental val-
ues of the pi, ρ and K or φ masses are employed to fix the physical scale and the light quark
masses” (Iwasaki, 2000). Every LQCD calculation takes great care to explain that they are
inferring the quark masses from the masses of observed hadrons (see, for example, Davies
et al., 2004; Du¨rr et al., 2008; Laiho, 2011).
This is important because fine-tuning involves a comparison between the life-permitting
range of the fundamental parameters with their possible range. LQCD doesn’t address either.
It demonstrates that (with no small amount of cleverness) one can measure the quark masses
in our universe. It does not show that the quark masses could not have been otherwise. When
Stenger compares two different values for the quark masses (3.3 MeV and 1.5-3 MeV), he is
not comparing a theoretical calculation with an experimental measurement. He is comparing
two measurements. Stenger has demonstrated that the u and d quark masses in our universe
are equal (within experimental error) to the u and d quark masses in our universe.
Stenger states that mn − mp results from md − mu. This is false, as there is also a
contribution from the electromagnetic force (Gasser & Leutwyler, 1982; Hall & Nomura,
2008). This would tend to make the (charged) proton heavier than the (neutral) neutron,
and hence we need the mass difference of the light quarks to be large enough to overcome this
contribution. As discussed in Section 4.8 (item 5), this requires α . (md−mu)/141 MeV. The
lightness of the up-quark is especially surprising, since the up-quark’s older brothers (charm
and top) are significantly heavier than their partners (strange and bottom).
Finally, and most importantly, note carefully Stenger’s conclusion. He states that no fine-
tuning is needed for the neutron-proton mass difference in our universe to be approximately
equal to the up quark-down quark mass difference in our universe. Stenger has compared our
universe with our universe and found no evidence of fine-tuning. There is no discussion of
the life-permitting range, no discussion of the possible range of mn −mp (or its relation to
the possible range of md −mu), and thus no relevance to fine-tuning whatsoever.
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4.8.2 The Strength of the Fundamental Forces
Until now, we have treated the strength of the fundamental forces, quantified by the coupling
constants α1, α2 and α3 (collectively αi), as constants. In fact, these parameters are a function
of energy due to screening (or antiscreening) by virtual particles. For example, the ‘running’








where the sum is over the charges Qi of all fermions of mass less than M . If we include all
(and only) the particles of the standard model, then the solution is
α1(M) =
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The integration constant, α1(M0) is set at a given energy scale M0. A similar set of equations
holds for the other constants. Stenger asks,
“What is the significance of this result for the fine-tuning question? All the
claims of the fine-tuning of the forces of nature have referred to the values of
the force strengths in our current universe. They are assumed to be constants,
but, according to established theory (even without supersymmetry), they vary
with energy.” [Foft 189]
The second sentence is false by definition — a fine-tuning claim necessarily considers different
values of the physical parameters of our universe. Note that Stenger doesn’t explicitly answer
the question he has posed. If the implication is that those who have performed theoretical
calculations to determine whether universes with different physics would support life have
failed to take into account the running of the coupling constants, then he should provide
references. I know of no scientific paper on fine-tuning that has used the wrong value of αi
for this reason. For example, for almost all constraints involving the fine-structure constant,
the relevant value is the low energy limit i.e. the fine structure constant α = 1/137. The fact
that α is different at higher energies is not relevant.
Alternatively, if the implication is that the running of the constants means that one cannot
meaningfully consider changes in the αi, then this too is false. As can be seen from Equation
15, the running of the coupling does not fix the integration constants. If we choose to fix
them at low energies, then changing the fine-structure constant is effected by our choice of
α1(M0) and α2(M0). The running of the coupling constants does not change the status of
the αi as free parameters of the theory.
The running of the coupling constants is only relevant if unification at high energy fixes
the integration constants, changing their status from fundamental to derived. We thus turn
to Grand Unification Theories (GUTs), of which Stenger remarks:
“[We can] view the universe as starting out in a highly symmetric state with
a single, unified force [with] strength αU = 1/25. At 10
−37 second, when the
temperature of the universe dropped below 3 × 1016 GeV, symmetry breaking
separated the unified force into electroweak and strong components . . . The elec-
troweak force became weaker than the unified force, while the strong force became
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stronger. . . . In short, the parameters will differ from one another at low energies,
but not by orders of magnitude. . . . the relation between the force strengths is
natural and predicted by the highly successful standard model, supplemented by
the yet unproved but highly promising extension that includes supersymmetry. If
this turns out to be correct, and we should know in few years, then it will have
been demonstrated that the strengths of the strong, electromagnetic, and weak
interactions are fixed by a single parameter, αU, plus whatever parameters are re-
maining in the new model that will take the place of the standard model.” [Foft
190]
At the risk of repetition: to show (or conjecture) that a parameter is derived rather than
fundamental does not mean that it is not fine-tuned. As Stenger has presented it, grand
unification is a cane toad solution, as no attempt is made to assess whether the GUT pa-
rameters are fine-tuned. All that we should conclude from Stenger’s discussion is that the
parameters (α1, α2, α3) can be calculated given αU and MU. The calculation also requires
that the masses, charges and quantum numbers of all fundamental particles be given to allow
terms like
∑
Q2i to be computed.
What is the life-permitting range of αU and MU? Given that the evidence for GUTs
is still circumstantial, not much work has been done towards answering this question. The
pattern α3  α2 > α1 seems to be generic, since “the antiscreening or asymptotic freedom
effect is more pronounced for larger gauge groups, which have more types of virtual gluons”
(Wilczek, 1997). As can be seen from Figure 6, this is a good start but hardly guarantees a
life-permitting universe. The strength of the strong force at low energy increases with MU,
so the smallness of MU/mpl may be “explained” by the anthropic limits on αs. If we suppose
that α and αs are related linearly to αU, then the GUT would constrain the point (α, αs)
to lie on the blue dot-dashed line in Figure 6. This replaces the fine-tuning of the white
area with the fine-tuning of the line-segment, plus the constraints placed on the other GUT
parameters to ensure that the dotted line passes through the white region at all.
This last point has been emphasised by Hogan (in Carr, 2007). Figure 8 shows a slice
through parameter space, showing the electron mass (me) and the down-up quark mass dif-
ference (md − mu). The condition labelled no nuclei was discussed in Section 4.8, point
10. The line labelled no atoms is the same condition as point 1, expressed in terms of the
quark masses. The thin solid vertical line shows “a constraint from a particular SO(10) grand
unified scenario” which fixes md/me. Hogan notes:
“[I]f the SO(10) model is the right one, it seems lucky that its trajectory passes
through the region that allows for molecules. The answer could be that even the
gauge symmetries and particle content also have an anthropic explanation.”
The effect of grand unification on fine-tuning is discussed in Barrow & Tipler (1986, pg.
354). They found that GUTs provided the tightest anthropic bounds on the fine structure
constant, associated with the decay of the proton into a positron and the requirement of grand
unification below the Planck scale. These limits are shown in Figure 6 as solid black lines.
Regarding the spectrum of fundamental particles, Cahn (1996) notes that if the couplings
are fixed at high energy, then their value at low energy depends on the masses of particles only
ever seen in particle accelerators. For example, changing the mass of the top quark affects
the fine-structure constant and the mass of the proton (via ΛQCD). While the dependence



















































World Figure 8: Constraints from the sta-
bility of hydrogen and deuterium, in
terms of the electron mass (me) and
the down-up quark mass difference
(md−mu). The condition labelled no
nuclei was discussed in Section 4.8,
point 10. The line labelled no atoms
is the same condition as point 1, ex-
pressed in terms of the quark masses.
The thin solid vertical line shows “a
constraint from a particular SO(10)
grand unified scenario”. Figure from
Hogan (in Carr, 2007).
Note also that, just as there are more than one way to unify the forces of the standard
model — SU(5), S0(10), E8 and more — there is also more than one way to break the GUT
symmetry. I will defer to the expertise of Schellekens (2008).
“[T]here is a more serious problem with the concept of uniqueness here. The
groups SU(5) and SO(10) also have other subgroups beside SU(3)×SU(2)×U(1).
In other words, after climbing out of our own valley and reaching the hilltop of
SU(5), we discover another road leading down into a different valley (which may
or may not be inhabitable).”
In other words, we not only need the right GUT symmetry, we need to make sure it breaks
in the right way.
A deeper perspective of GUTs comes from string theory — I will follow the discussion in
Schellekens (2008, pg. 62ff.). Since string theory unifies the four fundamental forces at the
Planck scale, it doesn’t really need grand unification. That is, there is no particular reason
why three of the forces should unify first, three orders of magnitude below the Planck scale.
It seems at least as easy to get the standard model directly, without bothering with grand
unification. This could suggest that there are anthropic reasons for why we (possibly) live in
a GUT universe. Grand unification provides a mechanism for baryon number violation and
thus baryogenesis, though such theories are currently out of favour.
We conclude that anthropic reasoning seems to provide interesting limits on GUTs, though
much work remains to be done in this area.
4.8.3 Conclusion
Suppose Bob sees Alice throw a dart and hit the bullseye. “Pretty impressive, don’t you
think?”, says Alice. “Not at all”, says Bob, “the point-of-impact of the dart can be explained
by the velocity with which the dart left your hand. No fine-tuning is needed.” On the
contrary, the fine-tuning of the point of impact (i.e. the smallness of the bullseye relative to
the whole wall) is evidence for the fine-tuning of the initial velocity.
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Figure 9: Anthropic constraints on the di-
mensionality of spacetime (from Tegmark,
1997). UNPREDICTABLE: the be-
haviour of your surroundings cannot be
predicted using only local, finite accuracy
data, making storing and processing in-
formation impossible. UNSTABLE: no
stable atoms or planetary orbits. TOO
SIMPLE: no gravitational force in empty
space and severe topological problems for
life. TACHYONS ONLY: energy is a vec-
tor, and rest mass is no barrier to particle
decay. For example, a electron could de-
cay into a neutron, an antiproton and a
neutrino. Life is perhaps possible in very
cold environments.
This flaw alone makes much of Chapters 7 to 10 of Foft irrelevant. The question of the
fine-tuning of these more fundamental parameters is not even asked, making the whole dis-
cussion a cane toad solution. Stenger has given us no reason to think that the life-permitting
region is larger, or possibility space smaller, than has been calculated in the fine-tuning liter-
ature. The parameters of the standard model remain some of the best understood and most
impressive cases of fine-tuning.
4.9 Dimensionality of Spacetime
A number of authors have emphasised the life-permitting properties of the particular combi-
nation of one time- and three space-dimensions, going back to Ehrenfest (1917) and Whitrow
(1955), summarised in Barrow & Tipler (1986) and Tegmark (1997)42. Figure 4.9 shows the
summary of the constraints on the number of space and time dimensions. The number of
space dimensions is one of Rees “Just Six Numbers”. Foft addresses the issue:
“Martin Rees proposes that the dimensionality of the universe is one of six param-
eters that appear particularly adjusted to enable life ... Clearly Rees regards the
dimensionality of space as a property of objective reality. But is it? I think not.
Since the space-time model is a human invention, so must be the dimensionality
of space-time. We choose it to be three because it fits the data. In the string
model, we choose it to be ten. We use whatever works, but that does not mean
that reality is exactly that way.” [Foft 51]
42See also Freeman (1969); Dorling (1970); Gurevich (1971), and the popular-level discussion in Hawking
(1988, pg. 180).
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In response, we do not need to think of dimensionality as a property of objective reality.
We just rephrase the claim: instead of “if space were not three dimensional, then life would
not exist”, we instead claim “if whatever exists were not such that it is accurately described
on macroscopic scales by a model with three space dimensions, then life would not exist”.
This (admittedly inelegant sentence) makes no claims about the universe being really three-
dimensional. If “whatever works” was four dimensional, then life would not exist, whether the
number of dimensions is simply a human invention or an objective fact about the universe. We
can still use the dimensionality of space in counterfactual statements about how the universe
could have been.
String theory is actually an excellent counterexample to Stenger’s claims. String theorists
are not content to posit ten dimensions and leave it at that. They must compactify all but
3 + 1 of the extra dimensions for the theory to have a chance of describing our universe. This
fine-tuning case refers to the number of macroscopic or ‘large’ space dimensions, which both
string theory and classical physics agree to be three. The possible existence of small, compact
dimensions is irrelevant.
Finally, Stenger tells us [Foft 48] that “when a model has passed many risky tests . . . we
can begin to have confidence that it is telling us something about the real world with certainty
approaching 100 percent”. One wonders how the idea that space has three (large) dimensions
fails to meet this criterion. Stenger’s worry seems to be that the three-dimensionality of space
may not be a fundamental property of our universe, but rather an emergent one. Our model
of space as a subset of43 R3 may crumble into spacetime foam below the Planck length. But
emergent does not imply subjective. Whatever the fundamental properties of spacetime are,
it is an objective fact about physical reality — by Stenger’s own criterion — that in the
appropriate limit space is accurately modelled by R3.
The confusion of Stenger’s response is manifest in the sentence: “We choose three [di-
mensions] because it fits the data” [Foft 51]. This isn’t much of a choice. One is reminded
of the man who, when asked why he choose to join the line for ‘non-hen-pecked husbands’,
answered, “because my wife told me to”. The universe will let you choose, for example, your
unit of length. But you cannot decide that the macroscopic world has four space dimensions.
It is a mathematical fact that in a universe with four spatial dimensions you could, with a
judicious choice of axis, make a left-footed shoe into a right-footed one by rotating it. Our
inability to perform such a transformation is not the result of physicists arbitrarily deciding
that, in this spacetime model we’re inventing, space will have three dimensions.
Stenger says of the parameters of physics that they are “ingredients in human-invented
models and while they have something to do with reality, we know not what” [Foft 68]. He
seems to be worried by the fact that the same physical theory can have a range of metaphys-
ical interpretations or pictures. For example, does quantum mechanics imply Copenhagen’s
collapsing wavefunctions, Everett’s constantly dividing universes or Bohm’s pilot wave? Ob-
servations will not tell us. How, then, do we really know what we are doing when we allow
the fine-structure constant to vary?
The answer to this question is: we don’t, but it doesn’t matter. These metaphysical pic-
tures are not arbitrary — they must reproduce our observations. They must all have the same
phenomenology. The fundamental constants of nature are part of this phenomenology. They
are not just fixed by observation; they can only be fixed by observation. These parameters are
thus not tied to any particular metaphysic, and thus the fine-tuning of the universe cannot
43Or perhaps Euclidean space E3, or Minkowskian spacetime.
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be dispensed by adopting a different philosophy of science. We do not need to know what the
fine-structure constant really is to reasonably suppose its value is not a necessary truth and
to predict what the universe would be like if it were different.
5 The Multiverse
On Boxing Day, 2002, Powerball announced that Andrew J. Whittaker Jr. of West Virginia
had won $314.9 million in their lottery. The odds of this event are 1 in 120,526,770. How could
such an unlikely event occur? Should we accuse Mr Whittaker of cheating? Probably not,
because a more likely explanation is that a great many different tickets were sold, increasing
the chances that someone would win.
The multiverse is just such an explanation. Perhaps there are more universes out there
(in some sense), sufficiently numerous and varied that it is not too improbable that at least
one of them would be in the life-permitting subset of possible-physics-space. And, just as
Powerball wouldn’t announce that “Joe Smith of Chicago didn’t win the lottery today”, so
there is no one in the life-prohibiting universes to wonder what went wrong.
Stenger says [Foft 24] that he will not need to appeal to a multiverse in order to explain
fine-tuning. He does, however, keep the multiverse close in case of emergencies.
“Cosmologists have proposed a very simple solution to the fine-tuning problem.
Their current models strongly suggest that ours is not the only universe but part
of a multiverse containing an unlimited number of individual universes extending
an unlimited distance in all directions and for an unlimited time in the past and
future. . . . Modern cosmological theories do indicate that ours is just one of an
unlimited number of universes, and theists can give no reason for ruling them
out.” [Foft 22, 42]
Firstly, the difficulty in ruling out multiverses speaks to their unfalsifiability, rather than
their steadfastness in the face of cosmological data. There is very little evidence, one way
or the other. More importantly, if Stenger has found no reasons for ruling out multiverses
in the theist literature then perhaps he should read the scientific literature. Even their most
enthusiastic advocate isn’t as certain about the existence of a multiverse as Stenger suggests.
A multiverse is not part of nor a prediction of the concordance model of cosmology. It
is the existence of small, adiabatic, nearly-scale invariant, Gaussian fluctuations in a very-
nearly-flat FLRW model (containing dark energy, dark matter, baryons and radiation) that
is strongly suggested by the data. Inflation is one idea of how to explain this data. Some
theories of inflation, such as chaotic inflation, predict that some of the properties of universes
vary from place to place. Carr & Ellis (2008) write:
“[Ellis:] A multiverse is implied by some forms of inflation but not others. Inflation
is not yet a well defined theory and chaotic inflation is just one variant of it.
. . . the key physics involved in chaotic inflation (Coleman-de Luccia tunnelling)
is extrapolated from known and tested physics to quite different regimes; that
extrapolation is unverified and indeed unverifiable. The physics is hypothetical
rather than tested. We are being told that what we have is “known physics →
multiverse”. But the real situation is “known physics → hypothetical physics →
multiverse” and the first step involves a major extrapolation which may or may
not be correct.”
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Stenger fails to distinguish between the concordance model of cosmology, which has excellent
empirical support but in no way predicts a multiverse, and speculative models of the early
universe, only some of which predict a multiverse, all of which rely on hypothetical physics,
and none of which have unambiguous empirical support, if any at all.
5.1 How to Make A Multiverse
What does it take to specify a multiverse? Following Ellis et al. (2004), we need to:
• Determine the set of possible universes M.
• Characterise each universe in M by a set P of distinguishing parameters p, being
careful to create equivalence classes of physically identical universes with different p.
The parameters p will need to specify the laws of nature, the parameters of those laws
and the particular solution to those laws that describes the given member m of M,
which usually involves initial or boundary conditions.
• Propose a distribution function f(m) on M, specifying how many times each possible
universe m is realised. Note that simply saying that all possibilities exist only tells us
that f(m) > 0 for all m in M. It does not specify f(m).
• A distribution function over continuous parameters needs to be defined relative to a
measure pi which assigns a probability space volume to each parameter increment.
• We would also like to know the set of universes which allow the existence of conscious
observers — the anthropic subset.
As Ellis et al. (2004) point out, any such proposal will have to deal with the problems
of what determines {M, f(m), pi}, actualized infinities (in M, f(m) and the spatial extent
of universes) and non-renormalisability, the parameter dependence and non-uniqueness of pi,
and how one could possibly observationally confirm any of these quantities. If some meta-law
is proposed to physically generate a multiverse, then we need to postulate not just a.) that
the meta-law holds in this universe, but b.) that it holds in some pre-existing metaspace
beyond our universe. There is no unambiguous evidence in favour of a.) for any multiverse,
and b.) will surely forever hold the title of the most extreme extrapolation in all of science,
if indeed it can be counted as part of science. We turn to this topic now.
5.2 Is it Science?
Could a multiverse proposal ever be regarded as scientific? Foft 228 notes the similarity
between undetectable universes and undetectable quarks, but the analogy is not a good one.
The properties of quarks — mass, charge, spin, etc. — can be inferred from measurements.
Quarks have a causal effect on particle accelerator measurements; if the quark model were
wrong, we would know about it. In contrast, we cannot observe any of the properties of
a multiverse {M, f(m), pi}, as they have no causal effect on our universe. We could be
completely wrong about everything we believe about these other universes and no observation
could correct us. The information is not here. The history of science has repeatedly taught us
that experimental testing is not an optional extra. The hypothesis that a multiverse actually
exists will always be untestable.
The most optimistic scenario is where a physical theory, which has been well-tested in
our universe, predicts a universe-generating mechanism. Even then, there would still be
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questions beyond the reach of observation, such as whether the necessary initial conditions
for the generator hold in the metaspace, and whether there are modifications to the physical
theory that arise at energy scales or on length scales relevant to the multiverse but beyond
testing in our universe. Moreover, the process by which a new universe is spawned almost
certainly cannot be observed.
5.3 The Principle of Mediocrity
One way of testing a particular multiverse proposal is the so-called principle of mediocrity.
This is a self-consistency test — it cannot pick out a unique multiverse as the ‘real’ multiverse
— but can be quite powerful. We will present the principle using an illustration. Boltzmann
(1895), having discussed the discovery that the second law of thermodynamics is statistical
in nature, asks why the universe is currently so far from thermal equilibrium. Perhaps,
Boltzmann says, the universe as a whole is in thermal equilibrium. From time to time,
however, a random statistical fluctuation will produce a region which is far from equilibrium.
Since life requires low entropy, it could only form in such regions. Thus, a randomly chosen
region of the universe would almost certainly be in thermal equilibrium. But if one were to
take a survey of all the intelligent life in such a universe, one would find them all scratching
their heads at the surprisingly low entropy of their surroundings.
It is a brilliant idea, and yet something is wrong44. At most, life only needs a low entropy
fluctuation a few tens of Mpc in size — cosmological structure simulations show that the rest
of the universe has had virtually no effect on galaxy/star/planet/life formation where we are.
And yet, we find ourselves in a low entropy region that is tens of thousands of Mpc in size,
as far as our telescopes can see.
Why is this a problem? Because the probability of a thermal fluctuation decreases ex-
ponentially with its volume. This means that a random observer is overwhelmingly likely to
observe that they are in the smallest fluctuation able to support an observer. If one were to
take a survey of all the life in the multiverse, an incredibly small fraction would observe that
they are inside a fluctuation whose volume is at least a billion times larger than their exis-
tence requires. In fact, our survey would find vastly many more observers who were simply
isolated brains that fluctuated into existence preloaded with false thoughts about being in
a large fluctuation. It is more likely that we are wrong about the size of the universe, that
the distant galaxies are just a mirage on the face of the thermal equilibrium around us. The
Boltzmann multiverse is thus definitively ruled out.
5.4 Coolness and the Measure Problem
Do more modern multiverse proposals escape the mediocrity test? Tegmark (2005) discusses
what is known as the coolness problem, also known as the youngness paradox. Suppose that
inflation is eternal, in the sense (Guth, 2007) the universe is always a mix of inflating and
non-inflating regions. In our universe, inflation ended 13.7 billion years ago and a period
of matter-dominated, decelerating expansion began. Meanwhile, other regions continued to
inflate. Let’s freeze the whole multiverse now, and take our survey clipboard around to all
parts of the multiverse. In the regions that are still inflating, there is almost no matter and
so there will be no life. So we need to look for life in the parts that have stopped inflating.
Whenever we find an intelligent life form, we’ll ask a simple question: how long ago did your
44Actually, there are several things wrong, not least that such a scenario is unstable to gravitational collapse.
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part of the universe stop inflating? Since the temperature of a post-inflation regions is at its
highest just as inflation ends and drops as the universe expands, we could equivalently ask:
what is the temperature of the CMB in your universe?
The results of this survey would be rather surprising: an extremely small fraction of life-
permitting universes are as old and cold as ours. Why? Because other parts of the universe
continued to inflate after ours had stopped. These regions become exponentially larger, and
thus nucleate exponentially more matter-dominated regions, all of which are slightly younger
and warmer than ours. There are two effects here: there are many more younger universes,
but they will have had less time to make intelligent life. Which effect wins? Are there more
intelligent observers who formed early in younger universes or later in older universes? It
turns out that the exponential expansion of inflation wins rather comfortably. For every
observer in a universe as old as ours, there are 1010
38
observers who live in a universe that
is one second younger. The probability of observing a universe with a CMB temperature of
2.75 K or less is approximately 1 in 1010
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Alas! Is this the end of the inflationary multiverse as we know it? Not necessarily.
The catch comes in the seemingly innocent word now. We are considering the multiverse
at a particular time. But general relativity will not allow it — there is no unique way to
specify “now”. We can’t just compare our universe with all the other universes in existence
“now”. But we must be able to compare the properties of our universe with some subset
of the multiverse — otherwise the multiverse proposal cannot make predictions. This is the
“measure problem” of cosmology, on which there is an extensive literature — Page (2011a)
lists 70 scientific papers. As Linde & Noorbala (2010) explains, one of the main problems is
that “in an eternally inflating universe the total volume occupied by all, even absolutely rare
types of the ‘universes’, is indefinitely large”. We are thus faced with comparing infinities. In
fact, even if inflation is not eternal and the universe is finite, the measure problem can still
paralyse our analysis.
The moral of the coolness problem is not that the inflationary multiverse has been falsified.
Rather, it is this: no measure, no nothing. For a multiverse proposal to make predictions, it
must be able to calculate and justify a measure over the set of universes it creates. The predic-
tions of the inflationary multiverse are very sensitive to the measure, and thus in the absence
of a measure, we cannot conclude that it survives the test of the principle of mediocrity.
5.5 Our Island in the Multiverse
A closer look at our island in parameter space reveals a refinement of the mediocrity test, as
discussed by Aguirre in Carr (2007); see also Bousso et al. (2009). It is called the “principle
of living dangerously”: if the prior probability for a parameter is a rapidly increasing (or
decreasing) function, then we expect the observed value of the parameter to lie near the edge of
the anthropically allowed range. One particular parameter for which this could be a problem is
Q, as discussed in Section 4.5. Fixing other cosmological parameters, the anthropically allowed
range is 10−6 . Q . 10−4, while the observed value is ∼ 10−5. Thus, Q isn’t particularly
close to either edge of the anthropically allowed range. As pointed out in Graesser et al.
(2004) and Feldstein et al. (2005), this creates problems for inflationary multiverses, which
are either fine-tuned to have the prior for Q to peak near the observed value, or else are steep
functions of Q in the anthropic range.
The discovery of another life-permitting island in parameter space potentially creates a
problem for the multiverse. If the other island is significantly larger than ours (for a given
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multiverse measure), then observers should expect to be on the other island. An example is
the cold big bang, as described by Aguirre (2001). Aguirre’s aim in the paper is to provide
a counterexample to what he calls the anthropic program: “the computation of P [the prob-
ability that a randomly chosen observer measures a given set of cosmological parameters]; if
this probability distribution has a single peak at a set [of parameters] and if these are near
the measured values, then it could be claimed that the anthropic program has ‘explained’ the
values of the parameters of our cosmology”. Aguirre’s concern is a lack of uniqueness.
The cold big bang (CBB) is a model of the universe in which the (primordial) ratio of
photons to baryons is ηγ ∼ 1. To be a serious contender as a model of our universe (in which
ηγ ∼ 109) there would need to be an early population of luminous objects e.g. PopIII stars.
Nucleosynthesis generally proceeds further than in our universe, creating an approximately
solar metalicity intergalactic medium along with a 25% helium mass fraction45. Structure
formation is not suppressed by CMB radiation pressure, and thus stars and galaxies require
a smaller value of Q.
How much of a problem is the cold big bang to a multiverse explanation of cosmological
parameters? Particles and antiparticles pair off and mutually annihilate to photons as the
universe cools, so the excess of particles over antiparticles determines the value of ηγ . We are
thus again faced with the absence of a successful theory of baryogenesis and leptogenesis. It
could be that small values of ηγ , which correspond to larger baryon and lepton asymmetry,
are very rare in the multiverse. Nevertheless, the conclusion of Aguirre (2001) seems sound:
“[the CBB] should be discouraging for proponents of the anthropic program: it implies that
it is quite important to know the [prior] probabilities P , which depend on poorly constrained
models of the early universe”.
Does the cold big bang imply that cosmology need not be fine-tuned to be life-permitting?
Aguirre (2001) claims that ξ(ηγ ∼ 1, 10−11 < Q < 10−5) ∼ ξ(ηγ ∼ 109, 10−6 < Q < 10−4),
where ξ is the number of solar mass stars per baryon. At best, this would show that there
is a continuous life-permitting region, stretching along the ηγ axis. Various compensating
factors are needed along the way — we need a smaller value of Q, which renders atomic
cooling inefficient, so we must rely on molecular cooling, which requires higher densities and
metalicities, but not too high or planetary orbits will be disrupted collisions (whose frequency
increases as η−4γ Q7/2). Aguirre (2001) only considers the case ηγ ∼ 1 in detail, so it is not
clear whether the CBB island connects to the HBB island (106 . ηγ . 1011) investigated by
Tegmark & Rees (1998). Either way, life does not have free run of parameter space.
5.6 Boltzmann’s Revenge
The spectre of the demise of Boltzmann’s multiverse haunts more modern cosmologies in
two different ways. The first is the possibility of Boltzmann brains. We should be wary
of any multiverse which allows for single brains, imprinted with memories, to fluctuate into
existence. The worry is that, for every observer who really is a carbon-based life form who
evolved on a planet orbiting a star in a galaxy, there are vastly more for whom this is all a
45Stenger states that “[t]he cold big-bang model shows that we don’t necessarily need the Hoyle resonance,
or even significant stellar nucleosynthesis, for life”. It shows nothing of the sort. The CBB does not alter
nuclear physics and thus still relies on the triple-α process to create carbon in the early universe; see the more
detailed discussion of CBB nucleosynthesis in Aguirre (1999, pg. 22). Further, CBB does not negate the need
for long-lived, nuclear-fueled stars as an energy source for planetary life. Aguirre (2001) is thus justifiably
eager to demonstrate that stars will plausibly form in a CBB universe.
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passing dream, the few, fleeting fancies of a phantom fluctuation. This could be a problem
in our universe — if the current, accelerating phase of the universe persists arbitrarily into
the future, then our universe will become vacuum dominated. Observers like us will die out,
and eventually Boltzmann brains, dreaming that they are us, will outnumber us. The most
serious problem is that, unlike biologically evolved life like ourselves, Boltzmann brains do
not require a fine-tuned universe. If we condition on observers, rather than biological evolved
life, then the multiverse may fail to predict a universe like ours. The multiverse would not
explain why our universe is fine-tuned for biological life (R.Collins, forthcoming).
Another argument against the multiverse is given by Penrose (2004, pg. 763ff). As with
the Boltzmann multiverse, the problem is that this universe seems uncomfortably roomy.
“. . . do we really need the whole observable universe, in order that sentient life
can come about? This seems unlikely. It is hard to imagine that even anything
outside our galaxy would be needed . . . Let us be very generous and ask that a
region of radius one tenth of the . . . observable universe must resemble the uni-
verse that we know, but we do not care about what happens outside that radius
. . . Assuming that inflation acts in the same way on the small region [that inflated
into the one-tenth smaller universe] as it would on the somewhat larger one [that
inflated into ours], but producing a smaller inflated universe, in proportion, we
can estimate how much more frequently the Creator comes across the smaller than
the larger regions. The figure is no better than 1010
123
. You see what an incredible
extravagance it was (in terms of probability) for the Creator to bother to produce
this extra distant part of the universe, that we don’t actually need . . . for our
existence.”
In other words, if we live in a multiverse generated by a process like chaotic inflation, then for
every observer who observes a universe of our size, there are 1010
123
who observe a universe
that is just 10 times smaller. This particular multiverse dies the same death as the Boltzmann
multiverse. Penrose’s argument is based on the place of our universe in phase space, and is
thus generic enough to apply to any multiverse proposal that creates more small universe
domains than large ones. Most multiverse mechanisms seem to fall into this category.
5.7 Conclusion
A multiverse generated by a simple underlying mechanism is a remarkably seductive idea. The
mechanism would be an extrapolation of known physics, that is, physics with an impressive
record of explaining observations from our universe. The extrapolation would be natural,
almost inevitable. The universe as we know it would be a very small part of a much larger
whole. Cosmology would explore the possibilities of particle physics; what we know as particle
physics would be mere by-laws in an unimaginably vast and variegated cosmos. The multiverse
would predict what we expect to observe by predicting what conditions hold in universes able
to support observers.
Sadly, most of this scenario is still hypothetical. The goal of this section has been to
demonstrate the mountain that the multiverse is yet to climb, the challenges that it must
face openly and honestly. The multiverse may yet solve the fine-tuning of the universe for
intelligent life, but it will not be an easy solution. “Multiverse” is not a magic word that will
make all the fine-tuning go away. For a popular discussion of these issues, see Ellis (2011).
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6 Conclusions and Future
We conclude that the universe is fine-tuned for the existence of life. Of all the ways that the
laws of nature, constants of physics and initial conditions of the universe could have been,
only a very small subset permits the existence of intelligent life.
Will future progress in fundamental physics solve the problem of the fine-tuning of the
universe for intelligent life, without the need for a multiverse? There are a few ways that this
could happen. We could discover that the set of life-permitting universes is much larger than
previously thought. This is unlikely, since the physics relevant to life is low-energy physics,
and thus well-understood. Physics at the Planck scale will not rewrite the standard model of
particle physics. It is sometimes objected that we do not have an adequate definition of ‘an
observer’, and we do not know all possible forms of life. This is reason for caution, but not
a fatal flaw of fine-tuning. If the strong force were weaker, the periodic table would consist
of only hydrogen. We do not need a rigorous definition of life to reasonably conclude that a
universe with one chemical reaction (2H → H2) would not be able to create and sustain the
complexity necessary for life.
Alternatively, we could discover that the set of possible universes is much smaller than
we thought. This scenario is much more interesting. What if, when we really understand
the laws of nature, we will realise that they could not have been different? We must be
clear about the claim being made. If the claim is that the laws of nature are fixed by logical
and mathematical necessity, then this is demonstrably wrong — theoretical physicists find it
rather easy to describe alternative universes that are free from logical contradiction (Davies,
in Manson, 2003). The category of “physically possible” isn’t much help either, as the laws
of nature tell us what is physically possible, but not which laws are possible.
It is not true that fine-tuning must eventually yield to the relentless march of science. Fine-
tuning is not a typical scientific problem, that is, a phenomenon in our universe that cannot
be explained by our current understanding of physical laws. It is not a gap. Rather, we are
concerned with the physical laws themselves. In particular, the anthropic coincidences are not
like, say, the coincidence between inertial mass and gravitational mass in Newtonian gravity,
which is a coincidence between two seemingly independent physical quantities. Anthropic
coincidences, on the other hand, involve a happy consonance between a physical quantity
and the requirements of complex, embodied intelligent life. The anthropic coincidences are
so arresting because we are accustomed to thinking of physical laws and initial conditions as
being unconcerned with how things turn out. Physical laws are material and efficient causes,
not final causes. There is, then, no reason to think that future progress in physics will render
a life-permitting universe inevitable. When physics is finished, when the equation is written
on the blackboard and fundamental physics has gone as deep as it can go, fine-tuning may
remain, basic and irreducible.
Perhaps the most optimistic scenario is that we will eventually discover a simple, beautiful
physical principle from which we can derive a unique physical theory, whose unique solution
describes the universe as we know it, including the standard model, quantum gravity, and
(dare we hope) the initial conditions of cosmology. While this has been the dream of physicists
for centuries, there is not the slightest bit of evidence that this idea is true. It is almost
certainly not true of our best hope for a theory of quantum gravity, string theory, which has
“anthropic principle written all over it” (Schellekens, 2008). The beauty of its principles has
not saved us from the complexity and contingency of the solutions to its equations. Beauty
and simplicity are not necessity.
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Finally, it would be the ultimate anthropic coincidence if beauty and complexity in the
mathematical principles of the fundamental theory of physics produced all the necessary low-
energy conditions for intelligent life. This point has been made by a number of authors, e.g.
Carr & Rees (1979) and Aguirre (2005). Here is Wilczek (2006b):
“It is logically possible that parameters determined uniquely by abstract theo-
retical principles just happen to exhibit all the apparent fine-tunings required to
produce, by a lucky coincidence, a universe containing complex structures. But
that, I think, really strains credulity.”
A Stenger on Cosmology
In this appendix we will correct some of Stenger’s statements about modern cosmology. For
example, Stenger states that “the universe hovers between eventual collapse and eternal ex-
pansion . . . at the critical density ρc = 3H
2/8piG. Note that this does not apply just for k = 0,
as is often thought. Curvature mass can contribute” [Foft 103]. One mark for the correct
equation, maybe, but the rest is wrong. Critical density only separates collapse from expan-
sion in universes with no cosmological constant; see Figure 3.5 of Peacock (1999, pg. 83).
The condition k = 0 defines the critical density. The “curvature mass” doesn’t contribute
to the critical density — nothing contributes to the critical density. Critical density specifies
how much total density (ρ) is needed to make the universe spatially flat. The curvature term
doesn’t contribute to the total density since it isn’t a form of energy, and Ω ≡ ρ/ρc would
then equal one by definition in all universes, rendering it useless as a cosmological parameter.
A.1 The Hubble Parameter and The Age of the Universe
The flatness problem can be restated as a constraint on the expansion rate of the universe,







where R is the radius of the universe, k = −1, 0, 1 in an open, flat and closed universe
respectively, ρ is the total density, Ω ≡ ρ/ρc, and ρc ≡ 3H2/8piG is the critical density, that
is, the density which gives the universe a flat geometry. If we compare the density parameter










≡ i . (17)
If we evaluate i at nucleosynthesis (∼ 1 second), which is the earliest time at which we have
observational data confirming the big bang model, then 1 ≈ 10−16. If we instead choose the
Planck time, which is the earliest time to which the model can be consistently extrapolated,
Pl ≈ 10−60. Given that Ω0 is within an order of magnitude of unity, it follows that∣∣∣∣1− ΩiΩi
∣∣∣∣ . i . (18)
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Ωi must be fine-tuned to be within 1±i. To express this limit in terms of the expansion rate,
let Hi be the value of the Hubble parameter at the initial time. Define the critical expansion
rate via H2i,c ≡ 8piGρi/3. Then, Equation (18) can be rewritten as∣∣∣∣∣H2i −H2i,cH2i,c
∣∣∣∣∣ . i ⇒
∣∣∣∣Hi −Hi,cHi,c
∣∣∣∣ . i2 . (19)
Hence, the expansion rate of the universe one second after the big bang must be fine-tuned to
one part in 1016. Hawking (1988) notes that inflation, if it happened, would explain why the
expansion rate was so close to critical. Stenger then tries to “show how that comes about”.
“The fractional rate of expansion of the universe is called the Hubble parameter.
. . . [T]he age of the universe is given by the reciprocal of the Hubble parameter.
. . . [I]t wouldn’t matter much whether the universe is 13.7 billion years old, or 12.7
or 14.7, so it is hardly fine-tuned. If the universe were only 1.37 billion years old,
then life on Earth or elsewhere would not yet have formed; but it might eventually.
If the universe were 137 billion years old, life may have long ago died away; but it
still could have happened. Once again, the apologists’ blinkered perspective causes
them to look at our current universe and assume that this is the only universe
that could have life, and that carbon-based life is the only possible form of life.
In any case, it is clear that the expansion rate of the universe is not fine-tuned to
‘one part in a hundred thousand million million’.” [Foft 203-4]
This is sophomorically wrong. The fine-tuning of the expansion rate relates to Hi, not H0.
They are not equal since H changes with time, and H0 does not appear in Equation (19). It
is the initial condition that needs to be fine-tuned, not the value today. No one is claiming
that the expansion rate today is fine-tuned to 1016, much less that the age of the universe
is fine-tuned. In fact, the age of the universe is part of the problem: as Hawking says, if
Hi one second after the big bang were different by “one part in a hundred thousand million
million”, the universe would have recollapsed before it reached 13.7 billion years old. Note
that Stenger’s explanation has nothing to do with inflation, so he is not expounding Hawking’s
solution, he is contradicting it.
A.2 The Parameters of the Concordance Model
The discussion of Q in Foft discusses a number of cosmological parameters:
“[T]he concordance model is still being perfected. The version published by Max
Tegmark, Matias Zaldarriaga and Andrew Hamilton in 200046 has [11] parameters.
. . . [T]he fact that [these parameters] can be fit to the data . . . is a testimony to the
incredible precision of the WMAP satellite experiment. Fine-tuners do not know
what to make of that and have simplified their claims to the single parameter Q.”
[Foft 209]
The classic paper on the fine-tuning of Q is Tegmark & Rees (1998), with a more complete
calculation in Tegmark et al. (2006). In the quote above, Stenger is claiming that Tegmark
& Rees (1998) and Tegmark et al. (2006) cannot handle the results of Tegmark et al. (2001).
46The paper was actually published in 2001.
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De´ja` vu? The first author of these papers is the same person, Max Tegmark of MIT. Stenger
has accomplished that most rare of logical fallacies, a self-refuting ad hominem. The second
author of Tegmark & Rees (1998) is Lord Baron Professor Sir Martin Rees, Astronomer
Royal, former President of the Royal Society, Professor of Cosmology and Astrophysics at the
University of Cambridge, and Master of Trinity College. The claim that he doesn’t “know
what to make of” WMAP is preposterous. Rees wrote many of the watershed papers in
the field of cosmological structure formation (e.g. Rees & Ostriker, 1977; White & Rees,
1978) and has led the field for four decades. Stenger’s reply, on the other hand, conclusively
demonstrates his ignorance of the literature; see Section 4.5.
Stenger’s discussion of the status of inflation in modern cosmology is similarly flawed:
“. . . [T]he total density of matter and the expansion rate, two parameters that
apologists claim are fine-tuned to incredible precision . . . are not listed as parame-
ters of [the concordance model in Tegmark et al. (2001)] to be fit to the data. They
are already assumed in the model to have the critical values given by inflation.”
[Foft 208]
Again, not correct and not relevant. The paper in question lists Ωk as one of the parameters
to be fit; it does not assume that Ωk = 0 as predicted by inflation. The total density is not
a free parameter because each of its components are fit. Even if the relevant expansion rate
was the expansion rate today (H0), this is not listed because it cannot be inferred from the
CMB alone. A range for H0 is inferred from other measurements and assumed as a prior.
Inflation does not predict H0.
At a deeper level, Stenger’s response completely misses the point of fine-tuning. The
measurement of the parameters of the concordance model gives their value in our universe,
today. Fine-tuning is about how the initial conditions could have been life-prohibitively
different in other possible universes.
A.3 Neutrino Masses
Concerning anthropic limits on the neutrino mass, Stenger complains that they
“assume that the number of neutrinos in the universe is fixed. It is not. Neutrinos
. . . form [a gas] of free (noninteracting) particles with fixed total energy. . . . If
their total energy is E, the total number of neutrinos will depend on their masses.
Decrease the masses, and the number increases; increase the masses, and the
number decreases.” [Foft 179-180]
Any good cosmology textbook will explain why Stenger is mistaken; here is one of the best
(Peacock, 1999, pg. 281).
“The consequences of giving [neutrinos] a mass are easily worked out provided the
mass is small enough. If this is the case, then the neutrinos were ultrarelativistic
at decoupling and their statistics were those of massless particles. As the uni-
verse expands to kT < mνc
2, the total number of neutrinos is preserved. . . . We
therefore obtain the present-day mass density in neutrinos just by multiplying the
zero-mass number density by mν .”
In short, the number of neutrinos (per comoving volume) does not change after the neutrinos
have stopped interacting with electrons in the very early universe (i.e. decoupling). For small
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masses, (mν . 1 MeV), the neutrinos will be effectively massless at decoupling, meaning
that the number of neutrinos is independent of their mass. This is precisely the opposite
of what Stenger says. Readers may wish to speculate on the (perhaps ironic) reason why
Stenger is able to claim in the preface that he “will present detailed new information not
previously published in any book or scientific article” [Foft 22]. The case where neutrinos
are non-relativistic (mν & 1 MeV) is discussed in Tegmark et al. (2005). Very heavy neutrinos
overclose the universe, result in no hydrogen left over from the big bang, and affect the ability
of supernovae to blow off their envelope.
Further, even if Stenger were correct, it wouldn’t matter to fine-tuning. The statement
“if we hold the total energy constant, then neutrino masses wouldn’t affect cosmology” is
only relevant if we have some reason to think that the total energy in neutrinos is the same
in all possible universes. The whole point of fine-tuning is that we are considering different
universes. As such, we are perfectly entitled to hold the number of neutrinos fixed if we so
desire. If Stenger knows of a deep physical reason why Ων is the same in all possible universes,
then we cosmologists would love to know.
A.4 Charge Neutrality
The universe, to the best of our knowledge, is electrically neutral. If the ratio of the number
of protons to electrons in an astronomical body were different from unity by one part in
α/αG ≈ 1037, then electrical repulsion would win out over gravitational attraction, and the
body would not be stable. No body could be held together by gravity. Stenger’s reply:
“[T]he number of electrons exactly equals the number of protons for a very simple
reason: as far as we can tell, the universe is electrically neutral, so the two particles
must balance because they have opposite charge. No fine-tuning happened here.
The ratio is determined by conservation of charge, a fundamental law of physics.
. . . Note that if the universe came from nothing, its total charge should be zero.”
[Foft 205]
This reply fails, though we will present a successful one below. Charge conservation follows
from gauge invariance, but gauge invariance does not follow from “point of view invariance”
as Stenger claims; see our discussion in Section 4.1.1. Further, the ratio of positive to negative
charge in the universe is not determined by charge conservation. Charge conservation doesn’t
tell us what the total charge (quniverse) of the universe is, only that it doesn’t change. Similarly,
protons and electrons do not balance because they have opposite charge. This argument might
work for protons and antiprotons, but that’s the surprising thing about electrical neutrality
in our universe — we manage it with two very different types of particles, subject to very
different physics. We need the excess of protons over antiprotons to be equal to the excess of
electrons over positrons, which implies a link between baryogenesis and leptogenesis.
The claim regarding a universe coming from nothing is either nonsensical or a non-
explanation. If we use the dictionary definition of ‘nothing’ — not anything — then a universe
coming from nothing is as impossible as a universe created by a married bachelor. Nothing
is not a type of thing, and thus has no properties. If you’re talking about something from
which a universe can come, then you aren’t talking about nothing. ‘Nothing’ has no charge
in the same sense that the C-major scale has no charge — it doesn’t have the property at all.
Alternatively, one could claim that the universe could have come from nothing by creatively
redefining ‘nothing’. ‘Nothing’ must become a type of something, a something with the rather
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spectacular property of being able to create the entire known universe. It’s an odd thing to
call ‘nothing’ — I wouldn’t complain if I got one for Christmas. The charge neutrality of
our universe then follows from the charge neutrality of ‘nothing’. The charge neutrality of
whatever ‘nothing’ happens to be is simply assumed.
However, charge neutrality is not a good case of fine-tuning for two reasons. We do not
have a well-understood theory of baryogenesis or leptogenesis, so we do not know how the
proton to electron ratio would change if the fundamental constants were different. We would
like to be able to successfully predict the degree of baryon and lepton asymmetry in our
universe before we have enough confidence in the relevant physics to predict what would
happen in other universes.
Further, in the absence of a theory of baryogenesis and leptogenesis, we can guess that
a process that creates an electrically neutral universe may not need fine-tuning. The life-
permitting range of quniverse includes a “natural” number: zero. Universes with quniverse = 0
are in some sense special in possibility space, whether or not they permit life. We are not
justified in proposing that quniverse = 0 is just as likely as some other value of quniverse.
A.5 Of G and αG
Stenger argues that gravity is not fine-tuned because the value given to G depends on the
system of units that we choose. This is true, but does not imply that G is “determined by
whatever units we work in” [Foft 235]. As an analogy, if you wish to be 100 lucs tall, you
need only define a new unit known as the luc. But it does not follow that your height is
determined by the metric system. Similarly, the SI system of units does not determine that
G = 6.673 × 10−11 kg−1 m3 s−2. Unless we use G to define our units, the value of G is a
contingent fact, and universes with different G would evolve differently.
Stenger also claims that αG is arbitrary, since it depends on the mass scale chosen in
its definition. We have used the proton mass. This only makes αG arbitrary if the proton
mass is an arbitrary choice. It clearly isn’t, since the proton is the lightest and thus most
stable hadron. It is αG, and not an analogous constant using some other mass scale, that
determines the characteristic sizes of planets, brown dwarfs, stars and white dwarfs, and
plays a significant role in galaxy formation (Silk, 1977; Carr & Rees, 1979; Press et al., 1983).
For example, the number of particles in a star is ∼ α−3/2G . In any universe in which these
quantities can be defined, the ratio (squared) of the lightest hadron mass to the Planck mass
is anything but arbitrary. If the composite nature of mp bothers you, then use ΛQCD. It
makes little difference.
B MonkeyGod
In Chapter 13, Stenger argues against the fine-tuning of the universe for intelligent life using
the results of a computer code, subtly named MonkeyGod. It is a Monte Carlo code, which
chooses values of certain parameters from a given probability density function (PDF) and
then calculates whether a universe with those parameters would support life. The parameters
varied in the code are (α, αs,mp,me). Stenger considers the following life-permitting criteria.
MG1. Radius of electron orbit > 1000 × radius of nucleus.
MG2. Energy of electron in atom < 1000 × energy of nuclear binding energy.
MG3. For stable nuclei, α < 11.8αs.
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MG4. Long-lived stars, tstar > 10 billion years.
MG5. Maximum mass of stars, > 10 × maximum mass of planet.
MG6. Maximum mass of planet, > 10 × minimum mass of planet.
MG7. Length of a planetary day, Tday > 10 hours.
MG8. Length of planetary year, Tyear > 100 days.
Of these eight criteria, three are incorrect, two are irrelevant, and one is insufficient. Plenty
more are missing. Most importantly, all manner of cherry-picked assumptions are lurking out
of sight, and the whole exercise exemplifies the cheap-binoculars fallacy.
We’ll begin with the irrelevant. The length of a day and a year are not life-permitting
criteria. I know of no fine-tuning article in the scientific literature defends such a limit, and
for good reason — the origin and survival of primitive forms of life probably wouldn’t be
affected by a shorter day or year. Plausibly, only larger organisms and ecosystems would be
influenced. The most we should conclude from this is that evolution would favour different
types of organisms to those we find on Earth47. Thus, while the length of a day and year
are discussed by Press et al. (1983) and Barrow & Tipler (1986), it is only to illustrate
that “there exist invariant properties of the natural world and its elementary components
which render inevitable the gross size and structure of almost all its composite objects”.
No anthropic constraint is derived. Furthermore, one cannot change the length of a day/year
without changing the fundamental constants, which themselves set the timescales for chemical,
thermodynamic and gravitational interactions. Thus, using a fixed upper-bound for Tday and
Tyear (10 hours and 100 days respectively) is almost meaningless. The same criticism applies
to the upper limit for tstar.
MG5 is insufficient, meaning that Stenger has inexplicably chosen a weaker constraint
over a stronger one. The stronger (and more obvious) constraint is that the maximum mass
of a star should be greater than the minimum mass of a star, as we saw earlier (Equation 10
and Figure 6). Stenger draws his equations from Press et al. (1983), comparing equation (34)
with (21), ignoring equation (32).
The first incorrect criterion is MG2; the factor of 1000 should be 1/1000. This is region
3 in Figure 6, and stems from the fact that we need the typical energy of chemical reactions
to be much smaller than typical nuclear energies. MG1 and (the correct version of) MG2
are similar, and the resulting life-permitting fractions that Stenger lists [Foft 244] are very
similar, which suggests that this is an error in the text but not in the code. MG3 is also
incorrect. The correct equation in Barrow & Tipler (1986, pg. 326) is α < 11.8α2s.






where L is the luminosity (energy radiated per unit time) of the star, and Mstar is its mass.
This is not the main-sequence lifetime of a star. Stenger cites equation (34) of Carr & Rees
(1979) as an estimate for tstar. However, Carr & Rees say that this is the “timescale . . . over
which an object of luminosity LE would radiate away its entire rest mass”. The estimate for
the main-sequence lifetime of a star is their equation (35), which includes an extra factor to
47In fact, a stronger (though still not conclusive) case could be made for an upper limit on Tday and Tyear; for
example, Tday can be made to be effectively infinite by tidal locking, wherein one side of the planet constantly
faces the star. On such a planet, one side would boil while the other froze.
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quantify “the fraction of a star’s rest mass that can be released through nuclear burning”.
Note that it is the top line of Equation (20) that is incorrect; Stenger’s new estimate for L
doesn’t correct this problem.
How significant is this extra factor, typically denoted  ≈ 0.007 in modern textbook deriva-
tions of tstar (Padmanabhan, 2000, pg. 30)? It is one of Martin Rees’ “Just Six Numbers”.
It reduces typical stellar lifetimes by two orders of magnitude in our universe. It depends on
the strong force (and the pion mass), so that Rees can translate the fine-tuning of the strong
force into limits on . If  were 0.006, deuterium would be unstable, meaning that stars would
be unable to produce larger elements. Only hydrogen, no chemistry, no planets, no complex
structures. If  were 0.008, no hydrogen would have survived the big bang. Stars that aren’t
fuelled by hydrogen have their lifetimes reduced by a factor of at least 30. Note that Rees
only varies one parameter because “Just Six Numbers” is a popular level book. As we saw in
Section 4.2.2, this is not a “mistake” [Foft 185], and the literature cited in Section 4.8 does
not make this assumption.
Many of the most widely discussed fine-tuning criteria are missing from Stenger’s list.
There are no cosmological limits, from big bang nucleosynthesis or from galaxy and star
formation. The stability of hydrogen to electron capture, the stability of the proton against
decay into a neutron, the limit on β for stable structures, electron-positron pair instability for
large α, stellar stability, the triple-α process, and the binding and unbinding of the diproton
and deuteron are not included. As can be seen from Figure 6, these are amongst the tightest
limits in parameter space.
The most serious problem with MonkeyGod is the probability distribution function (PDF).
The first step in the Monte Carlo algorithm is to choose a value for the point in parameter
space x ≡ (α, αs,mp,me) from a function p(x), which gives the probability of a universe
being formed with parameters in the range (x,x + dx), per unit dx. The functional form of
p (including the range of possible values48) is crucial. The set of possible choices for p is the
set of functions {p : R4 → R| ∫ p(x) dx = 1, p(x0) 6= 0}. This leaves plenty of options. Given
any set of life-permitting criteria, no matter how narrow or broad, one can always find a p
such that the life-permitting fraction flife has the value of your choosing. You can make life
certain or impossible, or anything in between. If we have no confidence in p, then we can
have no confidence in flife.
Stenger chooses the same, independent PDF for each parameter x:
pi(x) dx = A d(log10 x) for x ∈ (10−ax0, 10ax0) , (21)
and zero otherwise, where A is a normalisation constant, x0 is the value of the parameter x
in our universe, and two values of the constant a are considered, a = 1, 5. The function p(x)
is the product of the individual pi.
Firstly, Stenger not only makes no attempt to justify his use of a logarithmic prior, he has
contradicted his earlier statement that a uniform prior is “the best we can do” [Foft 72]. A
logarithmic prior spuriously inflates the value of flife by over-representing very small values
of a parameter. This point alone renders MonkeyGod ’s calculations meaningless.
Secondly, the range of x is centred (logarithmically) on the its value in our universe.
A better example of the cheap binoculars fallacy could not be invented. The range of x
is supposed to represent the range of possible values of x, independently of which values
48More precisely, we should pay careful attention to the boundary of the support of p, that is, set of points
where the function is non-zero.
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are life-permitting. To focus attention on our universe is to introduce a selection bias into
the calculation of flife. Our universe, you may have noticed, is life-permitting, and thus
MonkeyGod ’s sample range is necessarily biased towards life-permitting universes. It’s the
same mistake as trying to find out which party will win the next US federal election by taking
a survey at the Republican National Convention.
Finally, Stenger attempts to justify his choice of the parameter a in Equation (21), which
determines how many orders of magnitude the parameters are varied. He says
“. . . the standard model of physics and its promising extension, the minimum
supersymmetric standard model (MSSM), predict a connection between the force
strength parameters. . . . they are not independent variables, and it is unreasonable
to expect them to differ by as much as five or ten orders of magnitude at low
energies. Furthermore, . . . the particle masses are constrained by known, well-
established physics. Again, we would not expect the masses of the proton and
electron to differ by many orders of magnitude. . . . I present two sets of results:
one set where the parameters are varied by ten orders of magnitude, and one set
where they are varied by two orders of magnitude. Both cases are far more than
the differences expected in the standard model.” [Foft 243]
As explained in Section 4.8, this is nonsense. There are no “differences expected in the
standard model” because these are fundamental parameters. Their values are not determined
by the standard model. They can only be measured, not derived. Stenger seems to be
referring to the experimental limits on the parameters of the standard model. If that is the
case, then this is the coup de graˆce: Stenger has spent 300 pages criticising an idea whose
very definition he does not understand. Once again: fine-tuning calculations compare the
life-permitting subset with the possible range. Experimental limits are not relevant.
As for the MSSM, the fact that some of the parameters of the standard model might
be able to be derived from more fundamental parameters does not mean that they couldn’t
have been different, or that they are not fine-tuned. It means that we should consider the
variation the more fundamental parameters. A change in αU of ∼ 0.002 will change the
proton mass by an order of magnitude. The proton mass varies linearly with MU. We can
change the electron and quarks masses by changing either v or Γi, none of which are fixed by
the standard model or MSSM. Further, Stenger has argued that the masses of fundamental
particles are intrinsically zero. If one uses a logarithmic prior, and zero masses are possible
but not life-permitting, then the life-permitting fraction is zero. See also the discussion of the
coupling constants in Section 4.8.2.
We conclude that MonkeyGod is so deeply flawed that its results are meaningless.
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